Flotsam, Financing and Flotation: Is Canada “Resolution Ready” for Insurance Company Insolvency? by Sarra, Janis P.
The Peter A. Allard School of Law
Allard Research Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Publications
2019
Flotsam, Financing and Flotation: Is Canada
“Resolution Ready” for Insurance Company
Insolvency?
Janis P. Sarra
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, sarra@allard.ubc.ca
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Allard Research Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard Research Commons. For more information, please contact petrovic@allard.ubc.ca,
elim.wong@ubc.ca.
Citation Details
Janis Sarra, "Flotsam, Financing and Flotation: Is Canada 'Resolution Ready' for Insurance Company Insolvency?" Ann Rev
Insolvency L 2018 (Toronto: Carswell, 2019) 973.
Flotsam, Financing and Flotation:
Is Canada “Resolution Ready” for
Insurance Company Insolvency?
Janis Sarra*
Flotsam, gems of the sea
Floating to the surface
When all else is lost
Debris to some
But for others
Treasures recovered
E Pink, 19741
I. INTRODUCTION
Insurance is ubiquitous in Canada. We insure our homes, our
businesses, our lives. In some instances, insurance ismandatory
— we cannot get a construction mortgage2 or drive a car in
Canada without insurance.3 There are over 22 million
* Dr Janis Sarra, Presidential Distinguished Professor and Professor
of Law, University of British Columbia, Peter A Allard School of
Law. My sincere thank you to Mark Zelmer, Gordon Dunning and
Gale Rubenstein for their helpful comments on the draft of this
article, and to Paul Kovacs for his insights on resolution of P&C
insurers.
1 “Flotsam”, from the early 17th century, from Anglo-Norman
French ‘floteson’ — ‘to float’, Oxford University Dictionary.
2 Even home purchases in limited circumstances require insurance;
where the loan-to-value ratio is over 80 per cent, where the
mortgagee is self-employed or has a poor credit history; Govern-
ment of Canada, “How much you need for a down payment” (22
November 2017), online: Government of Canada5https://www.ca-
nada.ca/en/financial-consumer-agency/services/mortgages/down-
payment.html4.
3 Insurance is required in every province for vehicles to be operated,
as per: Insurance Bureau of Canada, “Understanding Auto
policyholders of life insurance and 25 million of health
insurance in Canada.4 Premiums paid for property and
casualty insurance in Canada totalled more than $48 billion
CAD in 2016, and $32 billionCADwere paid out in claims that
year.5 In addition to private companies, provincial
governments in some parts of Canada provide motor vehicle
insurance and operate the system.6 Insurance companies
provide important services that safeguard against loss of
income or assets due to injury, illness or catastrophic events.
Forms of insurance have been around since 3000BC, and there
is a long history regarding insurance and its regulatory
oversight.7 Today, insurance represents almost 2 per cent of
Canada’s gross domestic product (“GDP”).8 Yet we do not
often thinkabout theviabilityof thecompanies that insureusor
about the policyholder protection and resolution regime that
underpins the provision of these services.
Insurance” (2017), online: IBC 5http://www.ibc.ca/ab/auto4.
License and registration are not issued without insurance. However,
vehicles can be owned without insurance so long as they are never
operated.
4 Canadian Life andHealth Insurance Association, “Key Statistics” (2016),
online: CLHIA 5https://www.clhia.ca/web/CLHIA_LP4W_LND_-
Webstation.nsf/page/CCC69F7D565FDA75852581FC005BAF8B!Open-
Document4.
5 Insurance Bureau of Canada, “2017 Fact Book” (2017), online
(pdf): IBC 5http://assets.ibc.ca/Documents/Facts%20Book/
Facts_Book/2017/Fact-Book-2017.pdf4.
6 Provincial governments in British Columbia, Saskatchewan and
Manitoba operate auto insurance monopolies. Canada’s national
healthcare system is a form of insurance offered across the country.
7 Sam Woods, Executive Director of Insurance Supervision, “Em-
barking on a new voyage? Solvency II in context” (The Insurance
Institute of London Lecture delivered at Lloyd’s of London,
London, UK, 27 January 2016) at 3, online: Bank of England
5https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2016/embarking-on-a-
new-voyage-solvency-ii-in-context4.
8 Canada, Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0434-05 Gross domestic
product at basic prices, by industry, monthly, industry detail, growth
rates (x1,000,000) (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2018), online:
Government of Canada 5https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/
en/tv.action?pid=36100434054.
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However, several major failures of insurance companies
globally9 have highlighted the importance of effective
mechanisms for dealing with the insolvency of insurance
companies. The resilience of Canada’s insurance sector was
evident during the 2008-2010global financial crisis,whereboth
prudential oversight and policyholder protection stood
Canada in good stead. However, as new products and
technology develop, and as the complexity of multinational
insurance enterprises increases, new risks pose challenges for
Canada’s oversight and policyholder protection regimes.
“Insurer”, for purposes of this article, includes insurance
companies as legal entities, insurance holding companies,
insurance corporate groups, insurance-led financial
conglomerates, and the Canadian branches of foreign
insurance companies operating in Canada.10 In many
jurisdictions, insurers, as well as banks, are excluded from
corporate insolvency legislation.Canada isnodifferent. Ithasa
separate regime for life and health insurance (“life insurers”)
and property and casualty (“P&C”) insurers, with separate
policyholder protection funds. Depending on the nature of the
holdings, these policyholder protection funds are dealing with
federal or provincial regulators, or both, when an insurer is on
the cusp of insolvency or has become insolvent.
To “resolve” an insurer is to use a series of tools to address its
financial distress in a manner that safeguards the public
interest, including: ensuring continuity of the policies held by
customers; restructuring of all or part of the company to allow
it to continue operating where that option is viable;
facilitating orderly merger with another company; or
9 For a discussion, see PACICC, “Why insurers fail: Lessons learned
from the failure of HIH Insurance Limited” (2018), online:
PACICC 5http://www.pacicc.ca/publication/why-insurers-fail/4.
HIH was the second largest general insurer in Australia, with more
than 200 subsidiaries and extensive worldwide operations, its
insolvency affecting two million policyholders.
10 It is used interchangeably with “insurance company” in this article
to mean all these insurance businesses operating in Canada.
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providing for anorderlywindingupof an insolvent insurer. In
theCanadiancontext, it has alsobeendefinedas “theability to
restructure a company, which is needed for effective
resolution if recovery measures are not feasible or have
proven ineffective”.11
This article provides an overview of the insolvency regime for
insurers in Canada. It focuses primarily on the federal regime
as the exemplar of howCanadian regulators and the insurance
industry have built in policyholder protection and
mechanisms for early intervention. Part II examines the
causes of financial distress and the kinds of asset values that
may be identified and preserved during insolvency. Part III
explores the regulatory capital requirements imposed on
insurers with the goal of policyholder protection and safety
and soundness of the system. Part IV examines policyholder
protection and insolvency resolution strategies, including the
early intervention system, aimed at keeping companies afloat
or enabling them to exit the market with as little disruption as
possible. Part V briefly analyses how Canada’s supervisory
and resolution system measures up against international
standards. Part VI then explores aspects of the system that
need improvement and suggests priorities for legislative
reform, including clear assignment of responsibility for
resolution, treatment of derivatives and provisions to
facilitate cross-border proceedings. Part VII highlights new
complex challenges facing Canadian insurers in terms of
solvency risk, including accounting standards changes,
climate change risk and cybersecurity. Part VIII concludes.
II. FLOTSAM?
Flotsam is anoldmaritime termreferring to goods that float to
the surface of the sea when a ship sinks, salvaged by
11 Assuris, “Second Consultation Submission to Department of
Finance” (28 September 2017) at 1, online (pdf): Assuris
5https://www.fin.gc.ca/consultresp/pdf-pssge-psefc/pssge-psefc-
16.pdf4 [“Assuris 2017”].
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enterprising individuals.12 Today we also use it to mean the
goodsor assets of a companyor enterprise thatmay float to the
surface in terms of being realized for the benefit of the failing
company’s stakeholders. Flotsam can also have a negative
meaning, the detritus of a sinking company. The mixed
meanings are apt, as the failure of a business, including an
insurance business, can be for many reasons, including
inadequate capitalization or poor governance, or it can be
due to external market conditions even where the company is
well-managed and appropriately capitalized. On the failure of
an insurance company,manyassetsaregenerally ingoodorder
and retain their value. The Canadian regime for resolving
insurer distress, whether it is solvent recovery/resolution
before financial distress becomes insolvency, or
restructuring, sale or winding-up and liquidation at the point
the insurer is insolvent, is a set of mechanisms to recognize the
value that can be preserved and resources reallocated more
effectively. The mechanisms allow for transparency and
certainty in terms of an orderly process that preserves value.
Most importantly in Canada, the goal on insurer insolvency is
to protect the insurance policies held by individuals and
businesses. Rather than assets realized after the fact, the
Canadian system for insurance policyholders is to offer “life
rafts” prior to the ship sinking, bridging their insurance policy
to another sea-worthy company where possible, as discussed
throughout this article.
At the outset, it is important to understand some of the reasons
for insurer financial distress in Canada and the stakeholders
affected.
1. Causes of Insurers Sinking
As with all businesses, insurers need to be well managed and
sufficiently capitalized or they are likely to encounter financial
12 Martin Norris, The Law of Salvage (New York: Baker, Voorhis &
Co, 1958). The word comes from Old French “floter”, meaning “to
float”.
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distress. If insurers lose the confidence of customers, they are no
longer able to write new business, which can lead to insolvency.
If they lose the confidence of investors, it can be difficult to stay
sufficiently capitalized. Confederation Life suffered a liquidity
crisis as a result ofbeingunable to roll over its commercial paper
in the mid-1990s.13 Confederation Life had written
questionable business at questionable prices and was overly
aggressive in its investment strategy,ultimately compoundedby
liquidity issueswhen themarket lost confidence in thecompany.
Insurance companies have some specialized financial risks
because their liabilities can have “long tails” in terms of future
payouts, and thus their actual liabilities may be
underestimated. The long-term nature of many insurance
contracts exposes issuers to liability management risk. For
example, “life insurers make assumptions regarding the long-
term yield when pricing a product, butmay not be able to back
thatassumptionwithassetsofequalduration, exposing themto
reinvestment risk years into the future”.14 In addition, changes
in mortality and morbidity patterns may make assessing
liabilities and capitalization needs difficult. For example, a
life insurer may have provided long-term care guarantees
related to mortality and morbidity assumptions that prove to
be inaccurate over time. Equally, non-tangible assets may be
difficult to value at any given time and may be over-valued.
These risks are exacerbated where the insurer operates in
multiple markets and has multiple products.
A significant reason for failure can be weak corporate
governance or inadequate risk management that results in
poorpricingof product andpoor financial performance,which
13 Canada (Attorney General) v Confederation Life Insurance Co
(1995), 33 CBR (3d) 161, 31 CCLI (2d) 77, 24 OR (3d) 717 (Gen
Div), affirmed 1997 CarswellOnt 62, 32 OR (3d) 102, 145 DLR (4th)
747 (CA).
14 Mark Zelmer, Deputy Superintendent of OSFI, “A New Chapter in
Life Insurance Capital Requirements” (21 April 2016) at 2, online:
OSFI 5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/osfi-bsif/med/sp-ds/Pages/
mz20160421.aspx4.
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can cause capital to deteriorate. Inadequate capitalization is
one symptom of poor management. Another is a failure to
properly diversify.15
Low interest rates affect investment results in the P&C sector,
asasignificantportionof the investmentportfoliosare inbonds
and debentures.16 A current risk for life insurers is that
persistently low interest rates make asset and liability
management difficult and place strains on in-force product
profitability, given that contractual provisions of products do
not allow repricing of many insurance products.17
Insurers’ financial stability can also be affected by external
market conditions, for example, the global financial meltdown
in 2008-2010. The Canadian Office of the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions (“OSFI”) has observed that since the
2008 financial crisis, life insurers have reduced salesofproducts
with high-risk market guarantees, de-risked and re-priced
product offerings, increased their hedging of product risks,
divested themselves of high-risk blocks of business, and
strengthened their risk management practices, in turn
decreasing their sensitivity to interest rate and equity
fluctuations.18 While return on equity for the industry was 10
per cent and net income was $9.8 billion in 2016, 75 per cent of
the industry’s net income is attributable to the three large
conglomerate insurers.19
15 Swiss Re Group, “2018 Sonar Report” (31 May 2018), online:
Insurance Canada 5https://www.insurance-canada.ca/2018/05/31/
swiss-re-sonar-report/4 [“Swiss Re Group”].
16 OSFI, Annual Report 2016-2017 (2017) at 11, online (pdf): OSFI
5www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/Docs/ar-ra/1617/eng/ar1617.pdf4
[“OSFI, Annual Report 2016-2017”].
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid. OSFI observes: “Market volatility and persistently low interest
rates have had an effect on in-force product profitability as
investment yields have declined below yields anticipated when these
products were originally priced. However, companies have set up
additional balance sheet provisions to meet their future obligations
to policyholders.”
19 Ibid. 2016 are the statistics most recently available.
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A 2017 survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc
(“PwC”) found that, in Canada, industry participants identify
change management, technology and cybersecurity risk as the
three greatest risks to the insurance sector.20 Change
management is defined as “rapidly evolving markets, rising
customer expectations and new distribution channels that
threaten traditional insurance business models”, PwC
observing that incumbents held back by legacy systems and
traditional modes of thinking are trying to innovate in an
unfamiliar environment.21 Technological concerns that have
been identified range fromdriverless cars,22 issues generatedby
the Internet, artificial intelligence, algorithms,23 advances in
genetics, telematics and smart homes.24 Taking autonomous
and semi-autonomous cars as an example, while some research
suggests that increased use of autonomous driving technology
will lead to fewer accidents, the collisions that will occur may
result in costlier repairs and some uncertainties regarding
driver and manufacturer liability and victim compensation.25
Pricing such new markets is difficult, as well as the challenges
20 PwC and the Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation,
“Insurance Banana Skins 2017: What are the top risks facing the
insurance industry?” (2017), online: PwC 5https://www.pwc.com/
gx/en/industries/financial-services/insurance/insurance-banana-
skins-2017.html4 [“PwC, ‘Insurance Banana Skins’”]. 2017 survey
was based on 836 responses from practitioners, regulators and
observers of the insurance industry in 52 countries. Cybersecurity
and climate change are discussed in Part VIII of this article.
21 Ibid at 13.
22 See for example, Insurance Canada, “Travelers Outlines Frame-
work for Autonomous Vehicle Insurance” (24 July 2018), online:
Insurance Canada 5https://www.insurance-canada.ca/2018/07/24/
travelers-autonomous-vehicle-framework/4 [“Insurance Canada”].
23 Swiss Re Group notes that a growing number of business processes
are driven by algorithms, but algorithmic applications are not
infallible; they base their actions on human judgment and
discriminatory bias may translate into defective modelling and
prediction, bringing a two-fold risk to insurance and other
industries. Swiss Re Group, supra note 15.
24 PwC, “Insurance Banana Skins”, supra note 20 at 13.
25 Insurance Canada, supra note 22.
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that legacycompanytechnologyhas indigitizing itsofferingsor
effectively using big data.26
There can be information asymmetries regarding the value of
assets and liabilities such that it is unclear to oversight
regulators and stakeholders that an insurer is insolvent.
There are disputes in capital adequacy calculations, the
actuarial valuation, and the asset values that may affect
decisions regarding early interventionor even taking control. If
the supervisory authority has failed to detect the financial
distress or is reticent to act because it believes the company has
takenadequate steps toaddress capitalor liquidity inadequacy,
the failure to act could hinder the possibility of going-concern
recovery of the entity later.
Although insolvency regulation of insurers in Canada is
integrated with deposit-taking banks in terms of federal
supervisory oversight,27 insurers differ from banks in that
they are not systemically important to the functioning of the
financial system and the national economy such that their
failure has far-reaching consequences.28 Yet failure of one of
the multinational insurers headquartered in Canada could
involve shocks to the economy in terms of uncertainty for
policyholders, contagion risk for other insurers, and risk to
other sectors in which a large enterprise operates.
There are separate but aligned resolution systems and
insurance funds for insurers operating in Canada, divided
into the life insurance and P&C insurance sectors.29 The life
26 PwC, “Insurance Banana Skins”, supra note 20 at 13.
27 See the discussion in Part III.
28 For a discussion, see Janis Sarra, “Prudential, Pragmatic and
Prescient, Reform of Bank Resolution Schemes” (2012) Interna-
tional Insolvency Review 1-54, and Janis Sarra, “Bank Groups and
Financial Conglomerates, Retooling Resolution Regimes” (2014) 30
Law in Cont 7-50.
29 See for example, the industry-funded Assuris, which protects policy
holders of life insurance, online: Assuris “Protecting your life
insurance” (2018), online: Assuris 5http://www.assuris.ca/Client/
Assuris/Assuris_LP4W_LND_WebStation.nsf/welcome_en.html?-
ReadForm4 [“Assuris, ‘Protecting your life insurance’”]; and the
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insurance sector offers a range of products, such as term life
insurance, health insurance and annuities.30 The P&C
insurance industry in Canada provides coverage for all risks
other than life, including automobile, property and liability
insurance.31 Mortgage insurance is yet another product that is
subject to regulatory oversight.32 There are different rules for
life and P&C companies, depending on whether they are
federally or provincially regulated, although, as discussed
below, there is some convergence in standards.
industry-funded Property and Casualty Insurance Compensation
Corporation, “Welcome” (2018), online: PACICC 5http://
www.pacicc.com/4 [“PACICC”].
30 Term life insurance is a relatively inexpensive form of life insurance
that provides protection over a pre-defined period of time, becoming
more expensive as an individual gets older; permanent life insurance
provides guaranteed lifetime protection and premiums remain
constant. Universal life insurance in many cases provides consumers
with long-term or lifetime protection while at the same time making
possible tax-deferred savings. Premium may remain constant or may
rise over time and others combine both. Sun Life Assurance, “How
to choose the right type of life insurance” (29 August 2017), online:
Sun Life Financial. 5https://www.sunlife.ca/ca/Learn+and+Plan/
Money/Insuring+your+life/How+to+choose+the+right+ty-
pe+of+life+insurance?vgnLocale=en_CA4.
31 OSFI, “Guide to Intervention for Federally Regulated Property and
Casualty Insurance Companies” (March 2018), online: OSFI
5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fi-if/rai-eri/sp-ps/Pages/gi-
p.aspx4 [“OSFI, ‘Guide to Intervention for Federally Regulated
Property and Casualty Insurance Companies’”].
32 The mortgage insurance industry in Canada is composed of three
participants: two private sector insurance companies regulated by
OSFI, and the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation
(“CMHC”), which is a Crown corporation also subject to OSFI
oversight. OSFI, “Advisory Capital Requirements for Federally
Regulated Mortgage Insurers” (1 January 2017), online: OSFI
5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fi-if/rg-ro/gdn-ort/adv-prv/Pages/
cptins.aspx4. The Canadian Council of Insurance Regulators
(“CCIR”) has completed development of a nationally accepted set
of standard insurance classes: Canadian Council of Insurance
Regulators, “CCIR Recommends Adopting Streamlined Classes of
Insurance” (22 March 2002), online: CCIR 5https://www.ccir-
ccrra.org/Documents/View/26964.
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There have been very fewP&C insurer insolvencies.Only seven
of 161 insurers that exited theCanadian P&Cmarket in the 20-
year period from 1997 to 2017 were involuntarily closed
because regulators lost confidence in their ability to pay future
claims.33 The most common cause of P&C insurer failures in
Canada was poor underwriting results and claims reserving.34
33 PACICC, “Why insurers fail: Exit strategies of P&C insurers in
Canada” (2017), online (pdf): PACICC5http://www.pacicc.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/WIF-2017-Exit-Strategies.pdf4 [“PA-
CICC, ‘Why insurers fail’”]. PACICC, supra note 29. The
companies were: Strathcona General Insurance, Pitts Insurance,
Cardinal Insurance, Northern Union Insurance, Canadian Great
Lakes Surety, Mennonite Mutual Hail Insurance and Northumber-
land Insurance. There were many mergers during this period, at 1.
The companies were: 1) GISCO (ceased 2000), where PACICC
assessed members for $3.5 million. Total claims paid to policy-
holders from the estate totaled $5.3 million; estate was closed in
2016. 2) Alta Surety Company (ceased 2001) — OSFI took control
and the Court granted a winding-up and liquidation order; Alta
Surety sold policies not covered by PACICC. 3) Canadian Millers’
Mutual (ceased 2001): PACICC assessed member insurers for $3
million, claims paid to policyholders totaled $3.7 million; estate
closed in 2016, 15 years after the initial winding-up order was
issued. 4) Markham General (ceased 2002): PACICC assessed
members for $22 million. Claims paid to policyholders totaled more
than $21 million; insolvency took 13 years to complete, estate closed
in 2016. 5) Reliance Insurer (ceased 2003): solvent Canadian branch
of a troubled US insurer; early in the liquidation, PACICC
negotiated a loan and service agreement with the liquidator and
pledged a portion of PACICC’s assessment capacity to allow the
liquidator to “thaw” these assets and begin to pay creditors. The
liquidator of the estate determined that there was enough money in
the estate to pay 100 per cent of money owed to creditors. 6) Home
Insurance (ceased 2003): OSFI took control of the Canadian branch
in June 2003; and the Ontario Superior Court of Justice subse-
quently appointed Deloitte & Touche Inc as provisional liquidator
of the company, at 6-7.
34 Ibid at 6. David Hindley describes claims reserving as: “The process
of claims reserving is at the core of the financial management of
general insurance organizations. It determines what is held on the
balance sheet for claims that are not yet settled, affects the premiums
that are charged and impacts on the capital that is held to support the
solvency of the organization. Thus, the selection of appropriate
reserving methodologies and assumptions, and the application to
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In the life insurance sector in Canada, there have been four
insolvencies out of a total of more than 75 life insurers.35
2. Who is Affected by the Detritus of an Insurer Insolvency?
When an insurer fails in Canada, there are multiple
stakeholders implicated. First and foremost are the
policyholders. For example, policyholders that have been
paying premiums for many years likely cannot purchase life
insurance at the same price or benefit levels. They may not be
able to pass amedical examinationwith a new insurer that they
passed when they were 30 years younger, given that they are
aging and their health may be deteriorating, and they may be
uninsurable.Hence protection and continuationof the existing
policy is critically important.ForP&Cpolicyholders,mostwill
haveprepaid for insurance for theyear and thus there is valueat
risk as creditor policyholders if the insurer is wound up and the
policyholder faces another round of upfront costs to purchase
replacement insurance. Replacement insurance may be
difficult to find if the P&C market has changed or
“hardened”. Further, the policyholder may suffer a loss if a
claim is in excess of the coverage provided by the P&C
policyholder protection fund. The Winding-Up and
Restructuring Act (WURA) sets out the priorities given to
policyholders’ claims.36
practical situations, often with imperfect data, are of critical
importance to the operations of an insurance organization.” David
Hindley, Claims Reserving in General Insurance: International Series
on Actuarial Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017)
at 34.
35 Assuris, “2017 Annual Report” (2017) at 31, online (pdf): Assuris
5http://annualreport2017.assuris.ca/wp-content/themes/annual_-
report_theme/pdf/Assuris_AR_2017_EN.pdf4 [“Assuris, ‘2017
Annual Report’”]. They were: Les Coope´rants, Sovereign Life,
Confederation Life and Union of Canada Life; Assuris, “Past
Insolvencies” (2018), online: Assuris 5http://www.assuris.ca/Cli-
ent/Assuris/Assuris_LP4W_LND_WebStation.nsf/page/Past+In-
solvencies!OpenDocument&audience=member4 [“Assuris, ‘Past
Insolvencies’”].
36 Winding-Up and Restructuring Act, RSC 1985, c W-11, as amended
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The employees of an insurer are a second group of important
stakeholders. Here, the risks they face are similar to any other
failing business. On insolvency, employees will suddenly be
looking for work, competing with hundreds, if not thousands,
of terminated employees in the same sector. For older workers
in particular, it is difficult to find replacement work at a
commensurate level of pay and benefits. For pensioners
receiving pension benefits from the insurer as former
employer or employees of the insolvent insurer receiving
injury, illness and disability benefits, there is risk of
discontinuation of their benefits. Employees do not have
protection for their wages and benefits under the federalWage
Earner Protection Program Act (WEPPA) because the
insolvency of their employer insurer does not come within the
definition of bankruptcy or receivership under the statute.37
TheWURA does give priority for up to three months of wages
that are unpaid.38 That preference is only under specified
conditions, suchas the employeebeingunpaidat the timeof the
making of a winding-up order of the insurer, not exceeding the
arrears that have accrued during the threemonths immediately
preceding thedateof thatorder.39One important reformwould
[WURA]. Section 161 specifies that the order of claims payments are
the costs of liquidation, employee preferred claims, and then claims of
policyholders in a specified order. See also Assuris, “Past Insolven-
cies”, supra note 35, discussion of Les Coope´rants’ insolvency.
37 Wage Earner Protection Program Act, SC 2005, c 47, as amended
[WEPPA]. An insurer insolvency does not come under the bank-
ruptcy provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985,
c B-3, as amended [BIA], or the definition of receiver under the
WEPPA, which is “receiver means a receiver within the meaning of
subsection 243(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act”.
38 WURA, supra note 36, s 72: “Clerks or other persons in, or having
been in the employment of, a company, in or about its business or
trade, shall be collocated in the dividend sheet by special privilege
over other creditors, for any arrears of salary or wages due and
unpaid to them at the time of the making of a winding-up order in
respect of the company, not exceeding the arrears that have accrued
to them during the three months immediately preceding the date of
that order.”
39 Ibid. In the Confederation Life insolvency, employees who were
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be to amend the WURA to provide employees of insurers at
least the same protection as employees and pensioners receive
under Canadian bankruptcy legislation and theWEPPA.
Failedinsurersalsohavearangeofcreditorssuchasbondholders,
operating lenders, subordinated debt holders, trade suppliers,
landlords, and other creditors that have both secured and
unsecured claims on the assets of the insolvent company.
Directors can also be affected stakeholders in respect of an
insurer’s insolvency. Directors of insurers may be at risk of
personal liability if theyhave failed tomeet InsuranceCompanies
Act (ICA) and employment standards requirements for notice,
severance and termination pay for employees,40 although they
haveaduediligencedefenceunder the ICA.41Whereadirectorof
an insurance holding company pays employee compensation
debts that are proven in liquidation or bankruptcy proceedings,
the director is entitled to any preference to which the employee
would have been entitled, and, where a judgment has been
retained to help with the winding-up received “stay bonuses” and
some employees were paid on termination shortly after liquidation
proceedings commenced, but there is some question as to whether
employees who are terminated after the date of a liquidation order
have any rights to severance under the WURA provisions.
40 Insurance Companies Act, SC 1991, c 47, as amended [ICA], online:
Government of Canada 5http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca4. Section
844, ICA, specifies that directors of an insurance holding company
are jointly and severally, or solidarily, liable to each employee of the
insurance holding company for all debts not exceeding six months
wages payable to the employee for services performed for the
insurance holding company while they are directors. There are
conditions precedent to a finding of liability.
41 Ibid, s 845: “(1) A director, officer or employee of an insurance
holding company is not liable under section 841 or 844 and has
fulfilled their duty under subsection 795(2) if they exercised the care,
diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would have
exercised in comparable circumstances, including reliance in good
faith on (a) financial statements of the insurance holding company
that were represented to them by an officer of the insurance holding
company or in a written report of the auditor of the insurance
holding company fairly to reflect the financial condition of the
insurance holding company; or (b) a report of a person whose
profession lends credibility to a statement made by them.”
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obtained, the director is entitled to an assignment of the
judgment.42
Two additional stakeholder groups are the policyholder
protection funds, Assuris, for life insurers, and the Property
and Casualty Insurance Compensation Corporation
(“PACICC”) for property and casualty insurers.
Assuris, founded in 1990, is designated by the federal Minister
of Finance under the ICA, and specified in the Que´bec
“Re`glement d’application de la Loi sur les assurances” and
similar provincial legislation.43 Assuris is an industry-funded
not-for-profit corporation that offers protection to Canadian
policyholders for benefits underproducts issuedby life insurers
in Canada if a life insurer fails.44 Its objective is to protect
policyholders byminimizing the loss of benefits and ensuring a
quick transfer of their policies to a solvent company, to allow
benefits to continue.45
Assuris’ Memorandum of Operation sets out categories and
components of coverage:
a. Components of coverage
Benefits are covered under five components of coverage: Death
Benefit Coverage, Cash Value Coverage, Accumulated Value
Coverage, Monthly Income Coverage and Health Expense
Coverage.
b. Categories of coverage
Under each component of coverage there are four categories of
coverage: Individual Benefit, Individual Registered Benefit,
Group Benefit, and Group Registered Benefit.
For the Accumulated Value Coverage component there are two
additional categories: Individual Tax Free Savings Account and
Group Tax Free Savings Account.46
42 Ibid, s 844(5). The directors may also be indemnified by the
insurance holding company, ibid, s 846.
43 Assuris was formerly called CompCorp. “Re`glement d’application
de la Loi sur les assurances”, RLRQ, c A-32, r 1.
44 Assuris, “2017 Annual Report”, supra note 35.
45 Assuris, “Protecting your life insurance”, supra note 29.
46 See Assuris, “Articles 2.06-2.10, Memorandum of Operation, as
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Assurisworks to transfer thepolicies toa solvent company, and
on transfer,Assuris guarantees that policyholderswill retain at
least 85 per cent of the insurance benefits they were promised.
Accumulated values deposit-type products would also be
transferred to a solvent company, and Assuris guarantees
that policyholders will retain 100 per cent of their accumulated
value up to $100,000.47 Assuris has the dual role of protecting
policyholdersandworkingtowardsstrengthening thesystemto
ensure effective mechanisms are in place for recovery and
resolution of all life insurers operating in Canada.48 Its
objective in improving the current process is to ensure a
stable, effective and timely resolution process, control of the
amended and restated” (23 May 2013) [on file with author]
[“Assuris, ‘MOO’”]. Article 2.14 Maximum coverage per Covered
Person: “Death Benefit Coverage is 85%, but not less than 100% of
the first $200,000, of aggregate Benefits. Monthly Income Coverage
is 85%, but not less than 100% of the first $2,000 per month, of
aggregate Benefits. Health Expense Coverage is 85%, but not less
than 100% of the first $60,000, of aggregate Benefits. Cash Value
Coverage is 85%, but not less than 100% of the first $60,000, of
aggregate Benefits. Accumulated Value Coverage is 100% up to
$100,000 of aggregate Benefits. If aggregate Accumulated Value
Benefits are over $100,000, the Corporation will ensure that each
Covered Person receives at least $100,000.” Article 2.16, MOO:
“The Coverage Date is the effective date of calculation and
implementation of coverage under the terms of this Memorandum
of Operation. This date will be determined by the Board of
Directors and will normally be either the date on which the
Regulator took control of the Member or its assets or the date of
the Winding-Up Order against the Member.” Article 2.30 MOO,
Hardship Cases: “Where the Board of Directors is satisfied that the
loss suffered by a Covered Person, policyholder or beneficiary as a
result of the insolvency of a Member constitutes a hardship case, the
Board of Directors may authorize the Corporation to increase or
extend coverage or provide alternative compensation.”
47 Ibid at 6. “Assuris provides separate protection for individual,
group, registered and non-registered benefits. Assuris also provides
separate protection for individual Tax Free Savings Accounts and
group Tax Free Savings Accounts invested in accumulation
annuities.”
48 Assuris, “2017 Annual Report”, supra note 35 at 2, Chair’s
Message.
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costsof resolution,minimizationof losses topolicyholders, and
maintaining confidence in the system.49 To date, Assuris has
protected the policies of almost three million Canadians.50
The second policyholder insurance fund is PACICC, also an
industry-fundednot-for-profit organization. Its statedmission
is “toprotect eligible policyholders fromundue financial loss in
the event that amember insurer becomes insolvent”.51 Itworks
to minimize the costs of insurer insolvencies and maintain a
high level of consumer and business confidence in Canada’s
P&C insurance industry through the financial protection to
policyholders.52 PACICC is responsible for dealing with the
claims of policyholders under most policies issued by P&C
companies.53 P&C insurers fund the program to protect
policyholders and claimants in the event of a collapse of a
P&C insurer in Canada.54
Assuris andPACICCare stakeholders in the sense that theycan
be the largest contingent creditors at the point that an
insolvency proceeding commences. That role as creditor
crystallizes once Assuris or PACICC contribute financially to
support payments to policyholders, inwhich case, they become
a preferred creditor, either contractually or by court order.55
III. FINANCING—CAPITALADEQUACYREQUIREMENTS
FOR CANADIAN INSURERS
Oneobjective of regulation of the insurance sector is to protect
policyholders by ensuring that insurers are adequately
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid at 31.
51 PACICC, “Mission Statement” (2018), online: PACICC 5http://
www.pacicc.ca/about-us/mission-statement/4.
52 Ibid.
53 PACICC, supra note 29.
54 PACICC, “Why insurers fail”, supra note 33 at 4.
55 For example, for the four insolvencies in which Assuris was
involved, it entered into a loan agreement with the liquidator to
“top up the policyholders”, the agreement containing a clause that
specified that Assuris’ claim ranked below that of policyholders but
ahead of other unsecured creditors.
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capitalized, by setting requirements for capitalization that are
clear and certain for industry participants.Capital adequacy is
aimed at ensuring that insurers can absorb significant
unforeseen losses without risk to their solvency. The federal
ICA56 and provincial insurance statutes set out the legal
process for insurance companies to enter and exit the
marketplace.
The federal andprovincial governments share jurisdiction over
both life insurers andP&C insurers.57 Federally, that oversight
authority is OSFI, which has oversight of 67 life insurance
companies, 13 fraternal benefit societies,58 and 153 P&C
insurers, as well as other federally-regulated financial
institutions such as banks.59
The objectives of OSFI, as set out in its constating statute, the
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act
(OSFIA), are to: (a) supervise financial institutions in order
todeterminewhether they are in sound financial conditionand
arecomplyingwith theirgoverningstatute lawandsupervisory
requirements; (b) to promptly advise the management and
board of directors of a financial institution in the event the
institution is not in sound financial condition or is not
complying with its legal or supervisory requirements and, in
such a case, to take, or require the management or board to
take, the necessary corrective measures in an expeditious
manner; (c) to promote the adoption by directors and officers
of financial institutions of policies and procedures designed to
control and manage risk; and (d) to monitor and evaluate
system-wide or sectoral events or issues that may have a
56 ICA, supra note 40.
57 OSFI, “Who We Regulate” (2018), online: OSFI5http://www.osfi-
bsif.gc.ca/Eng/wt-ow/Pages/wwr-er.aspx?14 [“OSFI, ‘Who We
Regulate’”].
58 Ibid. A fraternal benefit society is an institution that has a
representative form of government and is operated for fraternal,
benevolent or religious purposes, including the insurance of
members, or the spouses/common law partners or children of
members, against accident, sickness, disability or death.
59 Ibid.
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negative impact on the financial condition of financial
institutions.60 In pursuing these objectives in respect of
insurers, OSFI strives to protect the rights and interests of
policyholders and creditors, having due regard to the need to
allow insurers to compete effectively and take reasonable
risks.61
The provincial governments regulate the licensing of insurance
companies operating within their jurisdictions as well as the
marketing of insurance products.62 Provincially, the
authorities have a number of different names;63 for example,
the Autorite´ des marche´s financiers (“AMF”) in Que´bec64 and
the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (“FSCO”) in
Ontario regulate the solvency and financial soundness of
insurers incorporated or formedunder provincial legislation.65
60 Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act, RSC 1985,
c 18 (3rd Supp), as amended, s 4(2), online (pdf): OSFIA 5http://
laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/O-2.7.pdf4 [OSFIA]. The purpose of
the OSFIA is: “3.1 The purpose of this Act is to ensure that
financial institutions and pension plans are regulated by an office of
the Government of Canada so as to contribute to public confidence
in the Canadian financial system.”
61 Ibid, s 4(3).
62 OSFI, “Who We Regulate”, supra note 57.
63 Regulation of member insurance companies is also performed by
the CCIR, and all the provincial governments.
64 Autorite´ des marche´s financiers, “Deposit Insurance in Que´bec 1967
to 2017”, (2017), online: Bibliothe`que et Archives nationales du
Que´bec 5https://lautorite.qc.ca/en/general-public/publications/
amf-publications/briefs-reports-or-documents/4. The AMF can
constitute a legal person or a partnership under a statute of Que´bec
to carry out the winding-up of the assets acquired from a registered
institution, it can acquire any security issued by a registered
institution and it can apply to the Superior Court for an order to
force the sale or amalgamation of a registered institution whose
permit has been suspended or cancelled.
65 Financial Services Commission of Ontario, “Insurance” (2018),
online: FSCO 5http://www.fsco.gov.on.ca/en/insurance/Pages/de-
fault.aspx4. In the insurance sector, FSCO is primarily a market
conduct regulator, supervising the treatment of consumers and the
conduct of business of insurance companies, agents, adjusters, and
service providers. Independent general insurance brokers in Ontario
are regulated by the Registered Insurance Brokers of Ontario, a self-
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The AMF has regulatory supervision over 64 life insurance
companies,66 130 P&C insurance companies,67 four Que´bec-
chartered companies that sell life, health andP&C insurance,68
and 16 reinsurers.69 As with OSFI, the AMF is responsible for
regulating and monitoring Que´bec registered insurers, and
intervening if an insurer fails to exercise sound and prudent
management practices and sound commercial practices, or
experiences difficulties, or if its solvency is threatened or
seriously compromised.70 It also monitors federally-regulated
regulatory body for insurance brokers in Ontario. Prudential
regulation of insurance companies is primarily performed by the
OSFI. FSCO, Annual Report 2016-2017 (2017), online: FSCO
5http://www.fsco.gov.on.ca/en/about/annual_reports/Pages/
ar2016-insurance.aspx>.
66 The number includes, as of August 2018, nine Que´bec-chartered
companies, five insurers chartered in other provinces, 32 federally-
chartered life and health companies and 18 chartered in other
countries, licensed to operate in Que´bec; Autorite´ des Marche´s
Financiers, “Breakdown of insurers authorized to carry on business
in Que´bec” (29 August 2018), online: AMF 5https://lautorite.qc.-
ca/en/professionals/insurers/breakdown-number-of-licensed-insur-
ers/. In addition, it supervises 12 life and health mutual benefit
associations4 [“AMF, ‘Breakdown of insurers authorized to carry
on business in Que´bec’”].
67 Ibid. Including, as of August 2018, 20 Que´bec-chartered companies,
five insurers chartered in other provinces, 55 federally-chartered
P&C insurers and 50 chartered in other countries, licensed to
operate in Que´bec.
68 Ibid. See also Autorite´ des Marche´s Financiers, “Intervention
Guidelines for Que´bec-chartered Life Insurers and Assuris Member
Companies” (April 2013), online (pdf): AMF 5file:///C:/Users/
sarra/OneDrive/Documents/1%20insurance%20resolution%20pa-
per%202018/AMF%20life%20intervention%20modalites_inter-
vention_amf_assuris_an.pdf4.
69 Ibid, including, as of August 2018, one Que´bec-chartered company,
four federally-chartered reinsurance companies and 11 chartered in
other countries, licensed to operate in Que´bec; AMF, “Breakdown of
insurers authorized to carry on business in Que´bec”, supra note 66.
70 Ibid. See also Autorite´ des Marche´s Financiers, “Guideline on
Capital Adequacy Requirements, property and casualty insurance”
(effective 1 January 2018) at 3, online (pdf): AMF 5https://
lautorite.qc.ca/fileadmin/lautorite/reglementation/lignes-directri-
ces-assurance/20180101-ligne-directrice-tcm_an.pdf4.
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life insurance companies licensed to operate in Que´bec.71 The
oversight authorities monitor the financing of insurers in the
life and P&C sectors, and set guidelines for how companies
measure and report on their capital adequacy.
As discussed earlier, insurers face a myriad of risks, including:
risks relating to the actuarial and/or statistical calculations
used in estimating liabilities; market, credit, liquidity and
operational risk from their investments and financial
operations; and risks associated with products of life cover
with a savings content and long-term pension products.72 The
regulatory and supervisory system of insurers is important to
maintaining a fair, safe and stable insurance sector for the
benefit and protection of the interests of policyholders.73
1. Federal Oversight of Capital Management
OSFI’s “supervisory framework” that guides its oversight of
federally-regulated financial institutions (“FRFI”), including
life and P&C insurers, combines a risk assessment-based
approach with capital adequacy oversight.74 OSFI is funded
primarily through assessments on the financial institutions.75
71 In 2018, there are 14 Assuris member companies that are Que´bec
registered and the rest are federally registered or registered in other
provinces but have a license to operate in Que´bec.
72 International Association of Insurance Supervisors (“IAIS”), “In-
surance Core Principles” (2017), online: IAIS 5https://www.iaiswe-
b.org/page/supervisory-material/insurance-core-principles//file/
70028/all-adopted-icps-updated-november-20174 [“IAIS, ‘Insurance
Core Principles’”].
73 Ibid at 4.
74 For a discussion of bank resolution in Canada, see Janis P Sarra, “A
Bridge Over Troubled Waters — Resolving Bank Financial Distress
in Canada”, in Janis P Sarra & Barbara Romaine, eds, Annual
Review of Insolvency Law 2017 (Toronto: Carswell, 2018) at 255
[“Sarra, ‘Bridge Over Troubled Waters’”]. OSFI, “The Supervisory
Framework” (2014), online: OSFI 5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/
fi-if/rai-eri/sp-ps/pages/sff.aspx4 [“OSFI, ‘Supervisory Frame-
work’”]. The Supervisory Framework is designed to assist OSFI in
meeting its statutory obligations set out in the OSFIA, supra note 60,
and other governing legislation regarding the supervision of FRFI.
75 OSFI, Annual Report 2016-2017, supra note 16, as well as the private
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OSFI’s supervision of insurers encompasses insurers
incorporated or continued under the ICA, as well as foreign
insurance companies that have been granted an order to insure
in Canada.76 The federally-regulated life insurance industry
consists of three conglomerate institutions and more than 70
domestic companies and foreign branches.77 The
conglomerates account for over 90 per cent of the assets for
the sector and have operations in Canada, the United States
(“US”), Europe, and Asia. These multinational insurers sell a
broad range of wealth management, life and health insurance
products through a number of distribution channels, whereas
domestic insurers tend to bemore restricted in product breadth
and distribution.78
OSFI’s supervision involves assessing the safety and soundness
of insurers, and using its authority for timely intervention
where necessary. Given that its primary goal is to safeguard
policyholders from loss, the focus of supervisory work is
determining the impact of current and potential future events,
both internal and from the external environment, on an
insurer’s risk profile.79 The oversight and monitoring are
really one of monitoring capital management, which OSFI
defines as:
Capital management is the on-going process of determining and
maintaining the quantity and quality of capital appropriate to support
pension plans it regulates and a user-pay program for legislative
approvals and other select services.
76 OSFI, “Who We Regulate”, supra note 57.
77 OSFI, Annual Report 2016-2017, supra note 16 at 10.
78 Ibid at 1.
79 OSFI, “Supervisory Framework”, supra note 74. Section 4(3) of the
OSFIA, supra note 60 specifies: “(3) In pursuing its objects, the
Office shall strive (a) in respect of financial institutions, to protect
the rights and interests of depositors, policyholders and creditors of
financial institutions, having due regard to the need to allow
financial institutions to compete effectively and take reasonable
risks; and (b) in respect of pension plans, to protect the rights and
interests of members of pension plans, former members and any
other persons who are entitled to pension benefits or refunds under
pension plans.”
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an insurer’s planned operations. Capital should be managed to maintain
financial strength, absorb losses so as to withstand adverse economic
conditions, allow for growth opportunities and meet other risk manage-
ment and business objectives. It should also be managed in order to
provide, in extreme cases such as imminent failure or insolvency,
sufficient assets to transfer or run-off policyholder obligations and pay
creditor claims.80
The ICA requires federally-regulated life insurance companies
and societies, holding companies and companies operating in
Canada on a branch basis to maintain adequate capital or to
maintain an adequate margin of assets in Canada over
liabilities in Canada.81 The ICA sets limits on equity
acquisitions and investments;82 limits on total property
interest;83 aggregate limits on the purchase or improvement
80 OSFI, “Regulatory Capital and Internal Capital Targets” (2018),
online: OSFI 5www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fi-if/rg-ro/gdn-ort/gl-ld/
Pages/a4_gd18.aspx4 [“OSFI, ‘Regulatory Capital’”].
81 ICA, supra note 40, ss 515(1), 992(1) and 608(1). OSFI, “Guideline,
Life Insurance Capital Adequacy Test” (“LICAT”) (effective 1
January 2018), online (pdf): OSFI 5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/
Eng/Docs/LICAT18.pdf4 [“OSFI, ‘Guideline, LICAT’”].
82 ICA, ibid s 507 specifies: “A company shall not, and shall not permit
its prescribed subsidiaries to,
(a) purchase or otherwise acquire any participating shares of any
body corporate or any ownership interests in any unincorporated
entity, other than those of a permitted entity in which the company
has, or by virtue of the acquisition would have, a substantial
investment, or (b) acquire control of an entity that holds shares or
ownership interests referred to in paragraph (a), if the aggregate
value of (c) all participating shares, excluding participating shares of
permitted entities in which the company has a substantial invest-
ment, and (d) all ownership interests in unincorporated entities,
other than ownership interests in permitted entities in which the
company has a substantial investment, beneficially owned by the
company and its prescribed subsidiaries exceeds, or the purchase or
acquisition would cause that aggregate value to exceed, an amount
determined in accordance with the regulations.’’
83 ICA, ibid, s 506, which specifies: “A company shall not, and shall
not permit its prescribed subsidiaries to, purchase or otherwise
acquire an interest in real property or make an improvement to any
real property in which the company or any of its prescribed
subsidiaries has an interest if the aggregate value of all interests of
the company in real property exceeds, or the acquisition of the
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of property;84 andother provisions and regulations that ensure
portfolio decisions do not negatively affect capitalization.
Capital adequacy isassessedbasedon theappropriatenessof its
level and quality, both currently and prospectively, and under
both normal and stressed conditions.85 OSFI has determined
industry minimum and target capital levels.
i. P&C insurer capital requirements
ForP&Cinsurers,OSFIhas issued the“MinimumCapitalTest
for Federally-Regulated Property and Casualty Insurance
Companies” (“MCT”) Guideline,86 which outlines the capital
framework, using a risk-based formula, for target and
minimum capital/margin required, and defines the capital/
assets thatareavailable tomeet theminimumstandard.87OSFI
assesseswhether aP&C insurermaintains adequate capital and
interest or the making of the improvement would cause that
aggregate value to exceed, an amount determined in accordance
with the regulations.”
84 ICA, ibid, s 508.
85 OSFI, “Key Principles” (2014), online: OSFI 5http://www.osfi-
bsif.gc.ca/eng/fi-if/rai-eri/sp-ps/pages/sff.aspx4 [“OSFI, ‘Key Prin-
ciples’”]. In the case of foreign branches, OSFI considers the
adequacy of capital equivalency deposits and vested assets.
86 OSFI, “Minimum Capital Test for Federally Regulated Property
and Casualty Insurance Companies” (effective 1 January 2018),
online (pdf): OSFI 5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/Docs/
mct2018.pdf4. Subsection 608(1) of the ICA requires foreign
P&C companies operating in Canada on a branch basis (foreign
property and casualty companies) to maintain an adequate margin
of assets in Canada over liabilities in Canada, ICA, supra note 40 at
1. MCT Guideline. Chapter 3, Foreign Companies Operating in
Canada on a Branch Basis, defines assets available for foreign P&C
companies operating in Canada on a branch basis. The capital
available also refers to assets available for “branch adequacy of
assets test” (“BAAT”) purposes, capital required refers to margin
required for BAAT purposes and capital adequacy refers to margin
adequacy for BAAT purposes.
87 Ibid at 1: “This MCT determines the minimum capital/margin
required and not the level of capital/margin required at which
property and casualty companies must operate.”
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whether a foreign P&C company maintains an adequate
margin pursuant to the ICA.88
P&C insurers are required to meet the MCT capital
requirements at all times.89 They are required to maintain an
MCTratio of at least 100per cent, andOSFIhas established an
industry-wide supervisory target capital ratio of 150 per cent,
which provides a cushion above the minimum requirement
capacity to absorb unexpected losses.90 The MCT is a
harmonized capital adequacy solvency test that is intended to
apply throughout Canada to P&C insurers, developed to
ensure consistency among federal and provincial jurisdictions
by applying the same capital framework to P&C insurers
operating in Canada.91
88 For example, consistent with Canadian P&C insurance companies,
Canadian branches of foreign P&C insurance companies are
required to use a specified amount of the company’s worldwide
capital and surplus in the calculation of their capital requirements
for earthquake risk, a component of the supervisory target. “Both
Canadian P&C insurance companies and Canadian branches of
foreign P&C insurance companies may include such amounts, to the
extent permitted in the MCT, in the determination of their internal
target”. OSFI, “Regulatory Capital”, supra note 80.
89 Ibid at 4. The minimum capital requirements are calculated as
follows: sum of: i.) Capital required for insurance risk: a. Capital
required for unpaid claims and premium liabilities; b. Margin
required for reinsurance ceded to unregistered reinsurers; and c.
Catastrophe reserves. ii.) Capital required for market risk: a.
Capital required for interest rate risk; b. Capital required for foreign
exchange risk; c. Capital required for equity risk; d. Capital required
for real estate risk; and e. Capital required for other market risk
exposures. iii.) Capital required for credit risk: a. Capital required
for counterparty default risk for balance sheet assets; b. Capital
required for counterparty default risk for off-balance sheet expo-
sures; c. Capital required for collateral held for unregistered
reinsurance and self-insured retention. iv.) Capital required for
operational risk. Less diversification credit, divided by 1.5. Ibid at 5.
90 Ibid at 6.
91 Financial Services Commission of Ontario, “Superintendent’s
Minimum Capital Test Guideline”, online: 5http://www.fsco.go-
v.on.ca/en/insurance/mincapitaltest/Pages/default.aspx4.
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Notwithstanding that a P&C company may meet the MCT
standards, OSFI may direct it to increase its capital92 or the
foreignP&Cinsurance company to increase itsmarginofassets
in Canada over liabilities in Canada.93 TheMCT is the capital
metric forCanadianP&Cinsurers,while the“branchadequacy
of assets test” (“BAAT”) is used for foreign-owned P&C
branch operations in Canada, whereby foreign P&C insurers
must vest assets in accordance with the BAAT in Canada.94
OSFI reports that the P&C sector is well capitalized, with a
relatively stable capital ratio of 269 per cent in 2016, well above
its supervisory target of 150 per cent.95
Given record levels of household debt in Canada, combined
with active residential real estate markets, OSFI has enhanced
its supervisory oversight of mortgage insurance.96 In 2017,
OSFI issued an advisory, “Capital Requirements for Federally
92 ICA, supra note 40, under s 515(3).
93 ICA, ibid, under s 608(4). OSFI states: “Foreign property and
casualty companies are reminded that the MCT is only one element
in the determination of the required assets that must be maintained
in Canada by foreign property and casualty companies.”
94 As prescribed in the “Assets (Foreign Companies) Regulations”,
SOR/2002-450, ICA, online:5http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/reg-
ulations/SOR-2002-450/page-1.html4. Section 3 specifies: “In
addition to the margin of assets in Canada over liabilities in
Canada required by section 608 of the Act, and subject to sections 6
and 7, every foreign life company shall, in relation to the classes of
life insurance, accident and sickness insurance, credit protection
insurance and other approved products insurance, maintain assets
in Canada the total value of which, when determined in accordance
with the accounting principles referred to in subsection 331(4) of the
Act, is at least equal to the aggregate of (a) the amount of the
reserve for actuarial and other policy liabilities of the company in
respect of those classes, determined on the same basis as the reserve
included in the company’s annual return, minus the amount of all
advances that were made by the company on the security or against
the cash surrender value of its life policies included in its annual
return, (b) the amount of the provision for claims incurred by the
foreign life company in respect of those classes that are unpaid, and
(c) the total amount of the other liabilities of the foreign life
company in respect of those classes.
95 OSFI, Annual Report 2016-2017, supra note 16 at 11.
96 Ibid at 2.
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Regulated Mortgage Insurers”, which defined a new, more
risk-sensitive approach to the regulatory capital requirements
for mortgage insurance, incorporating measures such as
borrower creditworthiness, outstanding loan balance, loan-
to-value ratio, and remaining amortization.97 OSFI initiated
enhanced industry-wide stress tests for mortgage insurers.98
ii. Life insurer capital requirements
For life insurers, the minimum capital test is referred to as the
“base solvency buffer” in the “Life Insurance Capital
Adequacy Test” (“LICAT”).99 The LICAT, effective 1
January 2018,100 and accompanying OSFI guidelines provide
the framework within which OSFI assesses whether a life
insurer maintains adequate capital or an adequate margin
pursuant to the ICA.101 Canada’s LICAT standard reflects
developments internationally regarding solvency standards,
aimed at enhancing investor and policyholder confidence.102
The OSFI guidelines establish criteria and limits for
determining the amount of an insurer’s qualifying regulatory
capital, referred to as “available capital plus surplus allowance
and eligible deposits in the LICAT” for life insurers.103 The
LICATmeasures the capital adequacy of an insurer and is one
of several indicators used by OSFI to assess an insurer’s
financial condition.
There has been an effort by some provincial regulators to align
with federal capital adequacy requirements for life insurers.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid at 4.
99 OSFI, “Regulatory Capital”, supra note 80.
100 OSFI, “Guideline, LICAT”, supra note 81. LICAT replaces
Minimum Continuing Capital and Surplus Requirement
(“MCCSR”) ratio as the key metric used to assess capital adequacy
for Canadian supervisory purposes: OSFI, Annual Report 2016-
2017, supra note 16 at 10.
101 OSFI, “Regulatory Capital”, supra note 80; plus ss 515(1), 992(1)
and 608(1), ICA, supra note 40.
102 OSFI, “Regulatory Capital”, ibid.
103 Ibid.
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For example, FSCO adopted LICAT for the fraternal benefit
societies for which it has oversight, also effective 1 January
2018.104 The British Columbia Financial Institutions
Commission and Alberta Treasury Board and Finance have
also adopted LICAT for life insurers incorporated in those
provinces.105
The OSFI “Guideline on Regulatory Capital and Internal
Capital Targets” sets out OSFI’s expectations with regard to
the capital and solvency assessment of federally regulated
insurers.106 OSFI evaluates the inherent risk within each
significant activity of a federally-regulated insurer and the
quality of risk management applied to mitigate these risks.
OSFI’s guideline establishes standards, using a risk-based
approach, for measuring specific life insurer risks and for
aggregating the results to calculate theamountofa life insurer’s
regulatory required capital to support these risks. It also
establishes criteria for determining the amount of qualifying
regulatory available capital.107 LICAT is only one component
104 Financial Services Commission of Ontario (“FSCO”), “2016 Annual
Return Instructions to Ontario incorporated insurers and reinsurers,
fraternal societies, and reciprocal insurance exchanges” (2017),
online: FSCO 5https://www.fsco.gov.on.ca/en/insurance/annual-
returns/Pages/2016-letter-instructions.aspx4. Its posting says that
it also adopted LICAT for life insurance companies, but there
appear to be none currently registered in Ontario. Its most recent
Annual Report states that it regulates 319 insurance companies, but
as of 2017, none were life insurers: FSCO, Annual Report 2016-2017
(2017) at 33, online: FSCO 5 http://www.fsco.gov.on.ca/en/about/
annual_reports/Pages/ar2016-credit-caisses.aspx4.
105 British Columbia Financial Institutions Commission, “Adoption of
the Life Insurance Capital Adequacy Test (LICAT)” (20 December
2017), online (pdf): Government of British Columbia 5https://
www.fic.gov.bc.ca/pdf/fid/correspondence/17-0802-ltr.pdf4. Al-
berta Treasury Board and Finance, Superintendent of Insurance,
“Overview — Guidelines for Provincially Regulated Insurance
Entities” (28 August 2018), online: Government of Alberta
5https://finance.alberta.ca/publications/insurance/insurers/osfi-
guidelines/index.html4.
106 OSFI, “Regulatory Capital”, supra note 80.
107 Ibid at 5. The Total Ratio focuses on policyholder and creditor
protection, assessing “Available Capital + Surplus Allowance +
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of the required assets that foreign life insurersmustmaintain in
Canada; these companies must also vest assets in Canada as
required by the ICA and its regulations.108 Even where a life
insurermeets capital standards,OSFImaydirect the life insurer
to increase its capital, although this authority is unlikely to be
exercised,absentotherconcernsaboutgovernanceor financing
of an insurer.109
OSFI also assesses an insurer’s liquidity risk and the quality of
its liquidity management.110 Liquidity risk arises from an
insurer’s potential inability to purchase or otherwise obtain the
necessary funds to meet its on- and off-balance sheet
obligations as they come due. OSFI then develops a
composite risk rating (“CRR”) for each insurer, after
assessing earnings and capital in relation to the overall net
risk from its significant activities, and the assessment of
liquidity,111 which is OSFI’s assessment of the insurer’s risk
profile.112 The CRR is OSFI’s assessment of the safety and
soundness of the insurer with respect to its policyholders.113
Eligible Deposits” Base Solvency Buffer, the Core Ratio focuses on
financial strength. The formula used to calculate the Core Ratio is:
Tier 1 Capital + 70 per cent of Surplus Allowance + 70 per cent of
Eligible Deposits Base Solvency Buffer.
108 “Assets (Foreign Companies) Regulations”, supra note 94, ICA,
supra note 40.
109 OSFI, “Guideline, LICAT”, supra note 81. The Superintendent’s
authority is pursuant to ss 515(3), 992(3) or 608(4), ICA, supra note
40.
110 OSFI, “Supervisory Framework”, supra note 74 at 6.
111 OSFI, “Regulatory Capital”, supra note 80, reporting that “While
regulatory capital is an important factor in OSFI’s capital assess-
ment, other factors are also considered. OSFI’s Capital Assessment
Criteria include, for example: adequacy of capital to support the
insurer’s risk profile and business plan, including risks that are not
fully captured in the regulatory capital guidelines; ability to access
capital at reasonable rates to meet projected needs; quality of
capital; quality or strength of the insurer’s capital management
policy, including its capital management processes; and director and
officer roles, responsibilities and effectiveness with respect to the
insurer’s capital management processes.”
112 OSFI, Annual Report 2016-2017, supra note 16 at 12.
113 Ibid.
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There are four ratings for composite risk: “low”, “moderate”,
“above average” and “high”, guided by a set of assessment
criteria that were developed in consultation with the
industry.114 OSFI considers elements of capital that
contribute to financial strength through periods when an
insurer is under stress, as well as elements that contribute to
policyholder and creditor protection during wind-up, such as
subordinated debt.115 OSFI expects the level and quality of an
insurer’s capital and its capital management to be
commensurate with its circumstances, including its risk
profile, appetite for risk and operating environment.116
OSFI reports that “the number, severity and overall quality of
the stress scenarios used by an insurer to assess its capital
adequacy in relation to all relevant regulatory and internal
capital expectations are important considerations for OSFI
when it assesses the strength of an insurer’s capital”.117 It
assesses the processes an insurer has in place to monitor and
manage risk, business strategy, potential stress situations and
future changes, as well as the company’s ability to meet, on a
continuous basis, regulatory and internal capital
expectations.118
The CRR determines whether intervention by OSFI is
needed.119 OSFI supervision can include limited off-site
reviews or extensive on-site reviews, including regular review
of information and testing where necessary. OSFI also
undertakes benchmarking reviews to identify standard and
best industry practices.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid, reporting that “Past and emerging trends, including the outlook
for capital, earnings and liquidity, as well as the insurer’s prepared-
ness to deal with potential capital deficiencies, are relevant in
assessing the adequacy of an insurer’s capital position.”
117 OSFI, “Regulatory Capital”, supra note 80 at 2.
118 Ibid.
119 OSFI, “Composite Risk Rating and Assessment Criteria”, online:
5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fi-if/rai-eri/sp-ps/Pages/crr.aspx4.
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Annually, or as appropriate, OSFI sends a supervisory letter
to each insurer summarizing OSFI’s key findings,
recommendations and/or requirements, if necessary, and
discloses the insurer’s CRR. There can be interim letters also
sent as issues arise. Findings and recommendations are
discussed with the insurer before the letter is issued.120 The
insurer is usually asked to provide a response within 30 days
regarding actions it has taken in response.121
Similar to OSFI, the provincial regulatory authorities
undertake monitoring of capital adequacy and liquidity for
insurers registered in their jurisdiction. For example, AMF
sets guidelines and standards for insurers to which the La Loi
sur les assurances122 applies, particularly with regard to
solvency (capital adequacy) and sound and prudent
management practices.123 It has issued more than 20
guideline documents for the life and P&C sectors alone.124
AMF’s “Ligne directrice sur les exigences de suffisance du
capital, Assurance de personnes” outlines the minimum
capital requirements that, as with the federal requirements,
120 OSFI, “OSFI’s Supervisory Ratings”, online: 5 http://www.osfi-
bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fi-if/rai-eri/sp-ps/Pages/01-CEO_letter.aspx4. The
letter is generally issued within 45 calendar days of the completion
of a review.
121 Ibid.
122 La Loi sur les assurances, CQLR, c A-32 [La Loi sur les assurances].
123 Autorite´ des Marche´s Financiers, “Guidelines for Insurers” (2018),
online: AMF 5https://lautorite.qc.ca/en/professionals/insurers/
guidelines/4. Autorite´ des Marche´s Financiers, “Ligne directrice
sur les exigences de suffisance du capital: assurance de personnes” (1
Janvier 2018), online (pdf): AMF 5https://lautorite.qc.ca/filead-
min/lautorite/reglementation/lignes-directrices-assurance/
20180101-ligne-directrice-suffisance-capital-ass-personnes_V-
FO.pdf4 [“AMF, ‘Lignes directrice’”].
124 For example, ibid, and La Loi sur les assurances, supra note 122. See
also, Autorite´ des Marche´s Financiers, “Guideline on Capital
Adequacy Requirements: Property and casualty insurance” (effec-
tive 1 January 2018), online (pdf): AMF 5https://lautorite.qc.ca/
fileadmin/lautorite/reglementation/lignes-directrices-assurance/
20180101-ligne-directrice-tcm_an.pdf4.
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include the amount and type of minimum capital required for
an insurer to operate.125
2. Effective Governance
Part of OFSI’s supervisory authority is to assess the
effectiveness of a federally-regulated insurer’s corporate
governance framework. The ICA and companion statutes set
out the responsibilities of boardmembers.126 In exercising their
powers anddischarging their duties, directors andofficersof an
insurer must act honestly and in good faith with a view to the
best interests of the company, and exercise the care, diligence
and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in
comparable circumstances.127 Every director, officer and
employee of an insurer must comply with the statutes, the
regulations, the company’s incorporating instrument, and the
by-laws of the company.128 Directors are to manage or
supervise the management of the business and affairs of the
company, as well as establish audit committees and conduct
review committeeswith amajority of independent directors.129
These duty of care and fiduciary obligation provisions mirror
Canadian corporate legislation, and thus decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada that have held that directors, in
acting in the best interests of the company, must act as good
corporate citizens, and may consider the views of all
stakeholders,130 by analogy, translate into a fairly high
obligation for insurer directors to act prudentially.
125 AMF, “Ligne directrice”, supra note 123 at 5. Chapitre 1 pre´sente
un sommaire des Exigences de suffisance du capital en assurance de
personnes (l’« ESCAP »). AMF observes “La gestion du capital
constitue un processus tre`s large qui englobe non seulement la
mesure de la suffisance du capital, mais e´galement l’ensemble des
strate´gies, politiques et proce´dures par lesquelles une institution
de´termine et planifie l’utilisation de son capital.”
126 See Division II, Directors and Officers, ss 165-196, ICA, supra note 40.
127 ICA, ibid, s 166(1).
128 ICA, ibid, s 166(2).
129 ICA, ibid, s 165(1) and (2).
130 Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise, 2004 SCC 68,
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Pursuant to the ICA, directors and officersmust disclose to the
board any conflict of interest thatmay arise in connectionwith
their responsibilities,131 and directors can be held personally
liable, jointly and severally, for failing to comply with the
insurance statutes.132Adirectorwho fails to disclose a conflict,
or knowingly attends ameeting of directors where the contract
or transaction in which the director has an interest is being
considered or voted on, can be disqualified from holding a
position as director of any federally-incorporated financial
institution for five years.133
One study has observed that an area of governance that could
be improved would be to require directors to have at least a
certain minimum level of knowledge about the insurance
business in question, including the fundamental principles and
key risk variables with respect to the insurer, suggesting that
currently, although independent directors will almost always
have achieved considerable success in their main field of
interest, theymaynothave specializedskillsor experience in the
insurance sector.134
IV. FLOTATION — POLICYHOLDER PROTECTION
AND INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION STRATEGIES
“Flotation” is a jeu de mot in the sense that the early
intervention and resolution system for insurers in Canada
offers a number of tools to assist an insurer to address early
signs of financial distress, and then at increasing states of
financial distress, helping it to stay afloat before any decision is
made to let the company sink.
[2004] 3 SCR 461 at para 32; BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008
SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560 at para 99.
131 ICA, supra note 40, ss 211-215.
132 ICA, ibid, ss 216-219.
133 ICA, ibid, s 212.
134 Lawrie Savage, “From Trial to Triumph: How Canada’s Past
Financial Crises Helped Shape a Superior Regulatory System” (29
May 2014) SPP Research Paper No. 7-15 at 51, online: SSRN
5https://ssrn.com/abstract=24466764.
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OSFI’s supervisory target capital levels provide a signal that
triggers early intervention byOSFI to require insurers to act to
address difficulties. OSFI’s approach is “trust, but verify”.135
An insurer’s failure to maintain capital resources above the
supervisory targets is “indicative of material safety and
soundness concerns and a vulnerability to adverse business
and economic conditions that require immediate attention”.136
An insurer is to notify OSFI if its capital resources levels are
anticipated to fallbelow its internal targetsand toprovideplans
on how it expects to manage the risks and/or restore its capital
resources levels to its internal targets within a relatively short
periodof time.137Whenan insurer’s capital resourcesapproach
or fall below the supervisory targets, OSFI will increase its
intensity of supervision.138
OSFI assesses material risk of loss to policyholders on a
forward-looking basis to identify problems early in order to
intervene in a timely way. One of its principles is that risk
assessment relies on sound, predictive judgment and that
insurers must understand the drivers of material risk to the
company and continuously manage that risk.139
A critically important risk assessment conceptwithin theOSFI
supervisory framework is that of a “significant activity”, a
135 Jeremy Rudin, OSFI Superintendent, “Away from the Lamppost:
Culture, Conduct and the Effectiveness of Prudential Regulation”
(17 June 2015), online (pdf): OSFI 5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/
Eng/Docs/jr20150617.pdf4.
136 OSFI, “Regulatory Capital”, supra note 80.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid. OSFI: “Insurers are expected to determine an Internal Target of
total capital. Life insurers are expected to determine, in addition to
the Internal Target of total capital, an Internal Target of core capital.
OSFI should be notified when an insurer changes its Internal Targets.
Internal Targets should be set above Supervisory Targets. To
determine whether Internal Targets are above Supervisory Targets,
insurers should compare their total and core capital Internal Targets
to the total and core Supervisory Targets, respectively.”
139 OSFI, “Key Principles”, supra note 85. OSFI reports that “The
application of the Supervisory Framework culminates in a con-
solidated assessment of risk to a FRFI.”
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defined term.140 OSFI assesses key risks for each significant
activity. “Inherent risk” is the probability of amaterial loss for
policyholders due to exposure to, anduncertainty arising from,
current and potential future events.141 OSFI assesses inherent
risk on the basis of: credit risk, market risk, insurance risk,
operational risk, regulatory compliance risk, and strategic risk,
assigning a value of high, above average, moderate or low to
each significant activity.142 OSFI assesses the quality of risk
management at both the operational level, including the risk of
probability of material loss due to exposure to and uncertainty
arising fromcurrentand futurepotential events, and in termsof
oversight function. OSFI assigns a rating by comparing the
natureand levelsof the insurer’s controlsoroversight toOSFI’s
expectations developed when assessing the levels of the key
inherent risks.143 The net risks of the significant activities are
combined, based on relative importance, to arrive at the
“overall net risk” of the insurer, a consolidated rating or
assessment of the potential adverse impact that the significant
activities collectively could have on the insurer’s earnings
performance and adequacy of capital.144
When an insurer starts to experience financial distress, early
intervention by the regulator can mitigate potential damage.
OSFI’s early intervention system includes a “pre-stage”, after
which there are four stages of intervention. As at 31 March
2017, therewere 20 staged institutions,most in the Stage 1 early
warning category, although OSFI does not disclose the names
or sectors of these institutions.145
140 Ibid. A significant activity is a line of business, unit or process that is
fundamental to the FRFI’s business model and its ability to meet its
overall business objective.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
145 OSFI Annual Report 2016-2017, supra note 16 at 12 (most recent
data available).
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1. Life Savers for Life Insurance Companies
The reference here to “life savers” is to the flotation devices
thrown in the water to assist distressed and potentially
drowning people, not the popular candy that has been
around since 1912.146 Arguably, the various points of
intervention are devices to assist a financially troubled
insurer to address its capital or other risk management issues
prior to the point at which the company begins to sink. The
OSFI intervention process has the goal of identifying areas of
concern at an early stage and intervening so as to minimize
losses to policyholders and other creditors.147 The ICA
authorizes OSFI to intervene to address concerns that may
arise with federally-regulated life insurers.148
OSFI cooperates with Assuris at all stages of monitoring and
intervention, but the extent of cooperation deepens as a life
insurerbecomesmore financiallydistressed.Whena life insurer
is designated as being pre-stage, monitoring reveals normal
activity and no significant problems.149 Here, OSFI assesses
whether the life insurer’s policies and practices, controls and
circumstances are sufficient through both continuous
assessment and formal discussion on an annual basis.150 It
assesses the financial condition and operating performance of
the institution, reviews information obtained from statutory
filings, financial reporting requirements, and management
reporting to the board.151 OSFI also undertakes cross-sector
146 Created by chocolatier Clarence Crane, who wanted a sweet treat
that could stand up to the summer heat: Life Savers, “Sweet
Beginnings” (2016), online: Life Savers 5http://www.life-savers.-
com/anniversary4.
147 OSFI, “Guide to Intervention for Federally Regulated Life
Insurance Companies” (2013), online (pdf): OSFI5http://www.os-
fi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/Docs/sup_guide_life.pdf4 [“OSFI, ‘Guide to In-
tervention for Federally Regulated Life Insurance Companies’”].
148 Ibid.
149 For a detailed discussion, see Sarra, “Bridge Over Troubled
Waters”, supra note 74.
150 OSFI, “Supervisory Framework”, supra note 74.
151 Ibid. OSFI reports to the Minister of Finance on an annual basis.
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reviews for specific issues involving multiple institutions, in
some cases, across banking and insurance sectors. As noted
previously, the CRR is OSFI’s overall assessment of an
institution’s safety and soundness.152
If OSFI determines that the life insurer’s financial condition,
policies and procedures are sufficient and do not indicate
significant problems, the company will not typically be
staged.153 Essentially, OSFI has determined that the
combination of the company’s overall net risk, capital and
earnings makes the company resilient to most normal adverse
business and economic conditions.154
Assuris’ role in the intervention process is to protect
policyholders by minimizing loss of benefits and ensuring a
quick transfer of their policies toa solvent companywhere their
benefits will continue to be honoured.155 At the “pre-stage”,
Assuris analyzes information it obtains directly from member
companies andOSFI, discussing the results of its analysis with
OSFI and sharing any concerns.156
If a life insurer is categorized as Stage 1, OSFI has identified
deficiencies in the company’s financial condition, policies,
procedures or practices, conditions and circumstances that
could lead to the development of problems.157 Examples
include: the combination of the company’s overall net risk and
its capital and earnings compromises the company’s resilience;
or the companyhas issues in its riskmanagement orhas control
deficiencies. However, there is not yet a threat to solvency.158
OSFI will formally notify management, the board of directors
and the external auditor of the company by way of a
152 Ibid. OSFI can request that management provide a copy of the
supervisory letter to external auditors.
153 Ibid at 3.
154 Ibid.
155 OSFI, “Guide to Intervention for Federally Regulated Life
Insurance Companies”, supra note 147 at 1-2.
156 Assuris 2017, supra note 11 at 3.
157 Ibid at 5.
158 Ibid.
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supervisory letter that the company is at Stage 1 and require the
company to take measures to mitigate or rectify the identified
deficiencies. It will usually meet with directors and managers
and/or the external auditor to discuss remedial actions. It may
send a notice of assessment surcharge to the company.159
At this first stage, OSFI can also require more frequent and
extensive reporting, and it can direct the life insurer’s internal
specialists to conduct reviews that focus on particular areas of
concern, such as asset valuations or policy liability
valuations.160 It may enter into a prudential agreement with
the company for the purposes of implementing anymeasure to
improve the safety and soundness of the company, and it can
require the life insurer to increase its capital.161 The prudential
agreement can include requiring the life insurer to implement
any measure designed to protect the interests of its
policyholders and creditors in respect of its insurance
business in Canada.162 OSFI may also enter into a prudential
agreementwithan insuranceholdingcompany for thepurposes
of implementing any measure designed to protect the interests
of policyholders and creditors of any federal financial
institution affiliated with it.163 In some circumstances, OSFI
may impose business restrictions and/or issue a direction of
compliance. OSFI will notify Assuris that the company has
been staged and will meet with it to update information and
expected solutions.At stage 1,Assuris also analyses all relevant
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid at 5-6.
161 Ibid at 6. Section 675.1 of the ICA, supra note 40 specifies: “675.1
The Superintendent may enter into an agreement, called a
‘prudential agreement’, with a company, society or provincial
company for the purposes of implementing any measure designed to
maintain or improve its safety and soundness or with a foreign
company for the purposes of implementing any measure designed to
protect the interests of its policyholders and creditors in respect of
its insurance business in Canada.”
162 ICA, ibid, s 675.1.
163 ICA, ibid, s 1002.
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public information and information obtained directly from the
member insurer or from OSFI.164
At Stage 2, “risk to financial viability or solvency”, OSFI has
concluded that the life insurer has material safety and
soundness concerns and is vulnerable to adverse business and
economic conditions, and that there are problems that could
deteriorate into a serious situation if not addressed promptly.
At this stage, the problems are still not serious enough to
present an immediate threat to financial viability or
solvency.165 OSFI can order immediate remedial measures
aimed at rectifying problems within a specified time frame,
more extensive supervisory reviews, require the company to
incorporate the remedial measures in its business plan, require
thecompany’s externalauditor toenlarge thescopeof its review
of the financial statements and/or to perform other procedures
and prepare a report, or require a special audit to be performed
byan independent auditor.166OSFIwill informAssuris of data
obtained from enhanced supervisory reviews and expanded
audits. OSFI will commence contingency planning in
consultation with Assuris to enable OSFI to be ready to take
control of the life insurer or its assets in case of rapid
deterioration.167 Assuris analyzes the data, may develop
possible scenario analysis for the insurer’s recovery, and may
hire consultants to provide in-depth analysis of critical areas. It
maycommencedevelopingapreliminary restructuringplan.168
Assuris utilizes a designation of “company of concern”when it
becomesconcernedabout the financialviabilityofa life insurer.
An insurer can be designated as a company of concern “where
there are plausible events that would result in the company not
being able to meet its policyholder obligations”.169 Once
declared a company of concern, Assuris engages in additional
164 Assuris 2017, supra note 11 at 6.
165 Ibid at 7.
166 Ibid at 8.
167 Ibid at 8.
168 Ibid at 8.
169 Stephanie Greer, Senior Vice President, Risk & Resolution, Assuris,
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resolution analysis and has more frequent discussions with the
regulatory supervisors. The company of concern designation
would typically be an OSFI Stage 2 company.
At this stage, OSFI is focused onworking with the company to
restore it to financial going-concern health. Assuris is focused
on preparing for a potential resolution, including considering
the valuation of the policyholder liabilities if they are
transferred to another company.
The best resolution option for life insurance is to transfer the
policyholders to a solvent company where their policies will
continue to be honoured. This strategy maintains the most
value in the company and is usually the least cost option for the
industry.
The transfer value of policyholder liabilities may be
significantly higher than the book value in the financial
statements and could lead to losses to policyholders on
insolvency, particularly true for long-term guaranteed
business where prospective buyers will not assume aggressive
non-fixed income asset yields to back these long-term cash
flows. This risk became evident as a concern for Assuris after
the insolvency of Union of Canada. The loss to policyholders
was related to understated policyholder liabilities for transfer
purposes, which is different from the past experience with
insolvencies in the early 1990s, where the loss was related to
declines in asset values.170
At Stage 3, “future financial viability in serious doubt”, OSFI
has concluded that the life insurer has failed to remedy
problems identified at Stage 2 and the situation is worsening.
There are severe safety and soundness concerns.171At least one
of the following conditions are present: the combination of the
company’s overall net risk and its capital and earnings poses a
email correspondence, 1 August 2018, cited with approval, on file
with author.
170 Ibid.
171 OSFI, “Guide to Intervention for Federally Regulated Life
Insurance Companies”, supra note 147 at 9.
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serious threat to financial viability or solvency unless effective
corrective action is promptly undertaken; and/or the company
has serious issues in risk management or control deficiencies,
which present a serious threat to its financial viability.172
At this stage, in addition to requiring the actions set out in
Stages 1 and 2, OSFI may direct external specialists to assess
quality of assets, liquidity, sufficiency of reserves, policy
liabilities, and reliability of reinsurance arrangements; may
impose greater business restrictions on the company; may
require even more detailed information; and may place OSFI
staff at the company to monitor the situation on an ongoing
basis.173 OSFI will communicate to management and the
directors the importance of considering resolution options
such as restructuring the life insurer or seeking a purchaser.174
It is at this stage that Assuris would consider supporting a
solvent resolution.
If a life insurer is categorized as Stage 4, OSFI has determined
that it is experiencing severe financial difficulties and has
deteriorated to such an extent that the company has failed to
meet regulatory capital and surplus requirements and failed to
immediately rectify the situation; the statutory conditions for
takingcontrolhavebeenmet; and/or the companyhas failed to
develop and implement an acceptable business plan.175
At Stage 4, OSFI has determined that the life insurer will
become non-viable on an imminent basis. OSFI will consult
withAssuris regarding thesteps tobe taken, suchasproceeding
to liquidation, implementing the liquidation contingency plan
prepared during Stage 3, and identifying a liquidator and/or
appointment of a standby agent.176 If the statutory conditions
172 Ibid at 9.
173 Ibid at 9.
174 Ibid at 9-10.
175 Ibid at 11.
176 Ibid at 12. OSFI also reports that at this stage it would consult
about taking temporary control, arranging for interim manage-
ment, and planning for the conclusion of the control period,
although taking these actions would appear to be unusual as OSFI
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for taking control of assets exist,OSFImay assume temporary
control of the assets of the company and the assets under its
administration, or in the case of a foreign company, control of
its assets in Canada.177 It may take control of the company
itself. Ineither case, theMinisterofFinancemayadviseOSFI if
theMinister is of the view that it is not in the public interest to
do so.178
Assuris and OSFI will engage in frequent in-depth discussions
regarding the life insurer and Assuris will declare the company
to be a “troubled member”, which triggers certain oversight
functions for Assuris’ directors and officers. Assuris’ bylaw
defines troubled member as:
“Troubled Member” means any Member that is an Insolvent Member,
and any other Member as to which the board has determined that there is
a serious possibility that the Member may become an Insolvent
Member.179
When making a determination in connection with a proposed
financial commitmentbyAssuris, its boardmaydetermine that
an insurer is troubled notwithstanding that the possibility of
insolvency will be reduced or avoided by the making of the
proposed financial commitment.180 Assuris will also assist in
developing a detailed restructuring plan, estimate its coverage
exposure, and evaluate whether to make a financial
commitment to support a restructuring plan, depending on
the circumstances, in order to reduce its potential exposure.181
Assuris’ liquidity fund provides it with a source of liquid assets
toprovide immediate support to thepolicyholders of amember
has in the past sought to take control and ask to apply for a
winding-up order.
177 Together with its other assets held in Canada under control of its
chief agent, including all amounts received or receivable in respect
of its insurance business in Canada. Ibid at 11.
178 Ibid at 11-12.
179 Assuris, “By-Law No 1” (24 May 2018) at 5 [on file with author]
[“Assuris, ‘By-Law No 1’”].
180 Ibid at 5.
181 Ibid at 9.
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insurer determined by the Assuris board of directors to be a
troubled member.182
Assuris can financially assist a troubled member insurer under
specified circumstances set out in its Memorandum of
Operation and Bylaw, where its board concludes that it is
reasonably necessary to give effect to Assuris’ objectives.183
Financial commitmentsmay include loans byAssuris, back-up
guaranteeswithrespect toasset sales, guaranteeingor fundinga
transfer or sale of the business,184 or commitments of other
types, suchas thepurchasebyAssuris or anaffiliateof sharesor
other assets or the assumption of liabilities.185 The
commitments may be in favour of a troubled member insurer,
or of the liquidator of an insolvent member insurer, or of
persons or other entities dealingwith any of them.186Where an
insurer is insolvent, Assuris’ bylaw states:
Where a Member is an Insolvent Member, the Board of Directors may
cause the Corporation to enter into financial commitments with respect
to that Member if the Board of Directors is satisfied that the
commitments are consistent with the objectives of the Corporation and
likely to reduce the total cost to the Corporation of the insolvency.187
Where the troubled member is not insolvent, Assuris works
with OSFI or the relevant supervisor in developing any
financial support, including the supervisor providing
information on the troubled insurer relevant to Assuris’
decision.188 On entering into such financial commitments,
Assuris’ Memorandum of Operation specifies that
3.04(b) The terms on which the Proposed Commitments are to be made
include assurances that the Troubled Member will not continue the
insurance business under the same control as when it became a Troubled
Member. Such assurances shall comprise:
182 Assuris, “2017 Annual Report”, supra note 35 at 21. Also, Assuris,
“By-Law No 1”, supra note 179 at 25-27.
183 Assuris, “MOO”, supra note 46, Article 3.01.
184 Assuris 2017, supra note 11 at 5.
185 Assuris, “MOO”, supra note 46, Article 3.02.
186 Ibid.
187 Ibid, Article 3.03.
188 Ibid, Article 3.04.
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(i) the sale of control of the Troubled Member;
(ii) the sale of the insurance business of the Troubled Member; or
(iii) the orderly winding down of the insurance business of the
Troubled Member, preceded if appropriate by the sale of a portion
of the business.
Where a sale of control or of all or a portion of the insurance business is
contemplated the Board of Directors shall be satisfied that the sale is on
terms established through a process reasonably designed in all the
circumstances to identify the best available transaction.189
There are other conditions specified in the Memorandum of
Operation. If the Assuris board authorizes Assuris to make a
financial commitment to a troubled member, a separate fund
will be established to account for the costs and obligations to
that member company.190 Assuris will formulate a detailed
contingency plan for managing liquidation and funding its
coverage commitments.191
i. Winding-up the life insurer
OSFI can request theAttorneyGeneral of Canada to apply for
awinding-uporder in respectofa life insurer ithasplacedunder
control or the life insurance business in Canada of a foreign
company where the assets in Canada of the foreign company
are under its control.192 The WURA authorizes the court to
approve transfer of the business of the insolvent life insurer to
another life insurer and/or wind-up the insurer, liquidating its
assets.
Once a liquidator has been appointed, the liquidator will
determine themost effectiveway ofwinding-up the life insurer.
Options include completing a sale or merger transaction that
was agreed to prior to the winding-up order but could not be
completed without approval of the court; holding a bidding
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid.
191 OSFI, “Guideline to Intervention for Federally Regulated Life
Insurance Companies”, supra note 147 at 9.
192 Ibid at 12.
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process for the sale of the entire business of the failed company;
holdingmultiple bidding processes for parts of the business, as
wasdone in theConfederationLife insolvency;193or closing the
company, realizing its assets, and paying off claims as they are
made.194 Often the best solution is to sell the business,
preserving its goodwill, enhancing the recovery prospects for
all stakeholders and allowing the continuation of benefits to all
policyholders, particularly important for those policyholders
who are no longer insurable due to deterioration in their
health.195
The liquidator will recommend a winding-up that protects
policyholders asmuch as possible and protects the safety of the
system, whether that process involves an auction, a pre-
packaged sale of the business that is brought to the court for
approval, or liquidation of assets on a piecemeal basis. For the
four insolvencies of life insurers that have occurred, all the
Canadian policies were transferred to solvent life insurance
companies.196 A court-appointed liquidator under theWURA
is responsible to the court, taking into account the interests of
all stakeholders.
While the management of Assuris will keep its board of
directors alerted to a company considered troubled, it will
obtain its board’s commitment toprovide coverage in the event
of liquidation.197 In some circumstances, Assuris will assist in
193 Canada (Attorney General) v Confederation Life Insurance Co,
supra note 13. The UK operations were sold to Sun Life, the US
operations and the Canadian group life and health business were
sold to Great-West Life; and the Canadian residual “Oldco”
remained as a mutual company, selling par insurance for the most
part.
194 Janis Sarra and Gordon Dunning, “Assuring the Future: Reform of
the Insolvency Framework for Insurance Companies and other
Financial Institutions under the Canadian Winding-up and Restruc-
turing Act”, in Janis P Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law
2010 (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) at 132 [“Sarra and Dunning”].
195 Ibid.
196 Assuris 2017, supra note 11 at 1.
197 Ibid at 11.
Annual Review of Insolvency Law / 1017
planning for an orderly liquidation with the proposed or
appointed liquidator, including: preparing a closure manual
designed to assist with issues and procedures arising
immediately on liquidation; training information officers to
handle public inquiries; establishing funding and reporting
arrangements during liquidation; and developing strategies
with the liquidator foroperating thecompany in liquidation.198
Assuris has a current liquidity fundof $129million, available to
meet policyholder coverage, to a cap, in any insolvency.199 If a
life insurer fails and the liquidity fund does not have sufficient
capital, Assuris has the authority to assess member companies
to contribute to the cost of providing protection to
policyholders. Assuris is currently working with the industry
to double its liquidity fund to a base level of $200 million by
2021.200Assuris canmakespecificassessments tocover funding
needs in connection with particular troubled members and to
fund its liquidity fund, and it can levy an extraordinary
assessment under specified circumstances.201
ii. Resolution
There has been a shift in recent years, with both governments
and industry specialists looking to solvent resolution or other
going-concern solutions to insurer financial distress or capital
deficiencies. Previously, OSFI’s practice was that, once it took
control of a life insurer, it would apply to the Minister for a
winding-uporder.ThisnarrowviewofOSFI’s authoritymeant
198 Ibid at 11-12.
199 Assuris, “Assuris Funding” (2018), online: Assuris 5http://
www.assuris.ca/Client/Assuris/Assuris_LP4W_LND_WebSta-
tion.nsf/page/Assuris+Funding!OpenDocument&audience=mem-
ber4. Assuris, “2017 Annual Report”, supra note 35 at 13.
200 Assuris, “2017 Annual Report”, ibid at 2. In 2017, a Specific
Assessment of $15.2 million was collected from Members, being the
first of the five installments to increase the Base Level to $200
million: ibid at 13.
201 Articles 14.2 and 14.3, Assuris, “By-Law No 1”, supra note 179, as
well as Loan Assessments and Administrative Assessments.
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that value may be lost on winding-up, as well as causing
unnecessary disruption for policyholders.
While liquidationofan insurerunder theWURAmayappear to
be themost straight-forward strategy foran insolvent insurer, it
may not be the best resolution for the insurer’s policyholders,
creditorsandother stakeholders. If thereareanumberof legacy
liabilities, itmaybe difficult to find amarket for selling them. If
the valuation of assets and policyholder liabilities is complex
and cross-jurisdictional, it may take considerable time to value
the assets and liabilities, create an auction or other market to
sell themandultimatelycomplete thewinding-upof the insurer.
Asset values and policyholder liabilities may diminish where
liquidationprocessesare complicatedoruntimely.There isalso
an anti-selection issue: when a liquidation takes a long time,
policyholders may become concerned that the company may
ultimately not honour their benefits. Healthy policyholders
may surrender their policies and buy life insurance from
another company, but policyholders who are uninsurable due
to poor health will be unable to get alternative insurance or it
may be prohibitively expensive, and thus keep their insurance
with the failed company. The liabilities then become
unattractive to a potential purchaser of the insurance
business, as it may contain too many high-risk policyholders.
Moreover, the going-concern value of a business is often
greater than the liquidation value realized by piecemeal sale of
theassets, aspotentialpurchasers seevalue in futurebusinessor
in intangible assets such as customer lists and goodwill.
Distribution capability is often lost in liquidations, as well as
customer loyalty, two important reasons that going-concern
value may be higher.
With the evolution of international resolution practices, there
are now several tools that can be used to resolve the financial
distress of a life insurer that do not result in an immediate
winding-up of the insurer’s entire business. Sometimes a
restructuring solution can increase both policyholder and
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creditor confidence in the life insurer itself and in the industry
more generally, and can ultimately contribute to greater
financial stability within the sector.
One option is an “operational resolution plan”, which is a
detailed restructuring plan developed by a restructuring
professional that can include a recapitalization strategy,
transfer of the company or blocks of the business to new
owners or other existing life insurers, or merger of the
distressed life insurer with a solvent insurer, which may
benefit from the assets, goodwill and customer lists of the
insolvent business.202 Assuris would have significant input in
workingwith the restructuringprofessional toassess proposed
resolution plans during both their conceptualization and
implementation.
Maintaining operation of the life insurer for a limited period in
order to determine the best way of resolving the financial
distress couldmean leavingdirectors andofficers in control but
with the guidance of an insolvency professional; placing a chief
restructuring officer (“CRO”) at the helm of the insurer; or the
supervisor or its designated liquidator or insolvency
professional taking control of the insolvent life insurer. Each
of these governance strategies have benefits and some
limitations.
OSFI can take control of a life insurer pursuant to the ICA,
essentially replacing the board or appointing an insolvency
professional to replace the board.203 OSFI may take control
when it has identified governance problems such as board
unresponsiveness to previous directions at the early
intervention stages or a lack of skills and experience by
directors and senior officers to guide the insurer through a
resolution process, be it restructuring, merger or liquidation.
Taking control may also assist OSFI or its designate in
protecting the Canadian insurance operations of a
multinational company or corporate group from contagion
202 Assuris 2017, supra note 11 at 4.
203 ICA, supra note 40, s 679(1).
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frominternationaloperationsor fromcreditorsof thecompany
in foreign jurisdictions.
As with bank resolution,204 one option to resolve life insurer
financial distress is to restructure by separating and
transferring the “good assets” and the policyholder
liabilities to a new company (“newco”), leaving behind the
assets and liabilities that are problematic in terms of ability to
sell them in themarket in theoriginal company (“oldco”).One
advantage is that it may continue the insurance policies,
resulting in no losses for policyholders. Such a strategy may
also encourage further investment in the newco, facilitating
recapitalization of the business. In the case of multinational
insurers, the Canadian branch of an insurance conglomerate
may be viable as a standalone, separate entity, and
continuation of the insurer’s business in the newco could
protect going-concern value. The valuable assets placed in the
newco could also protect the Canadian assets from claims, at
least for a period, from foreign policyholders. Moreover,
secured creditors of the insolvent insurermay bewilling under
this strategy to compromise their claims or make other
arrangements that allow a going-concern solution to the life
insurer’s financial distress.
Assuris has establishedCompCorpLife, a special purpose life
insurer that is able to act as bridge institution if needed for
resolution. An example of using a bridge institution was the
Sovereign Life liquidation.205
2. A Casualty of Financial Distress: P&C Insurer Intervention
and Resolution
Aswith the life insurance sector, the objective of OSFI’s early
interventionprocess for federally-regulatedP&Cinsurers is to
enable OSFI to identify areas of concern at an early stage and
intervene effectively in order to minimize losses to
204 For a discussion, see Sarra, “Bridge Over Troubled Waters”, supra
note 74.
205 Assuris 2017, supra note 11.
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policyholders and other creditors.206 Early intervention in a
P&C insurer can control losses to policyholders and thus costs
to other insurers; and could mean that policyholders receive
full compensation for losses, rather than just the current cap
on P&C claims.207 The same ICA intervention powers
discussed previously for life insurers allow OSFI to
intervene to address any concerns with a P&C company. As
with life insurers, OSFI has primary responsibility for
regulating and supervising federally-regulated P&C
companies, conducting risk-based assessments of the safety
and soundness of these companies. The pre-stage and four
stages of intervention by OSFI are the same as discussed
previously for life insurers, the “Guide to Intervention for
Federally Regulated Property and Casualty Insurance
Companies” outlining the types of involvement of OSFI and
PACICC in terms of the circumstances under which certain
intervention measures may be taken.208 The newMarch 2018
OSFI guide allows PACICC to have discussions with
regulators at an earlier point in the process and have greater
access to information than was available in previous
insolvencies.209
To protect policyholders’ rights, the supervisory authority of
a P&C insurer has the authority to force an insolvent insurer
206 OSFI, “Guide to Intervention for Federally Regulated Property and
Casualty Insurance Companies”, supra note 31.
207 PACICC, “Submission to Department of Finance Canada on
Positioning Canada’s Financial Sector for the Future” (15 Novem-
ber 2016), online (pdf): Government of Canada 5https://
www.fin.gc.ca/consultresp/pdf-ssge-sefc/ssge-sefc-48.pdf4 [“PA-
CICC 2016”]. PACICC claims limits are: “Auto and commercial
insurance policies — up to $250,000; home insurance policies — up
to $300,000 per policy. Policy deductibles are applied to the total
amount of the insured loss.” PACICC, “Coverage” (2018), online:
PACICC5http://www.pacicc.ca/industry-information/coverage/4.
208 OSFI, “Guide to Intervention for Federally Regulated Property and
Casualty Insurance Companies”, supra note 31.
209 PACICC, “Solvency Matters” (June 2018), online (pdf): PACICC
5http://www.pacicc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/SM2_Ju-
ne_English.pdf4.
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out of themarket by seeking awinding-up order from a court,
and usually replacing the insurer’s management with a court-
appointed liquidator.210 The court freezes the assets of the
insurer to give the liquidator time to assess the financial
resources of the company compared to its liabilities.211
Consumers are directed to find a new insurer within a
reasonable time period, generally 45 days, after which time,
their insurance contracts cease to protect them.212 The
liquidator hires independent actuaries to review the
adequacy of the insurer’s claims reserves and it reviews the
insurer’s reinsurance contracts. 213 PACICC also works with
liquidators both before and after their appointment.
In a P&C insurance business, the best solution may be to pay
off the claims as they are made. Property and casualty
insurance, typically, is renewable each year; there is less
goodwill associated with the business; and the majority of
policyholders can also usually obtain alternative coverage.
One difference is that OSFI’s and PACICC’s Pre-insolvency
Regulatory Liaison Committee (“PIRL” committee) will meet
to discuss any remedial measures that OSFI has requested a
P&C insurer to undertake.214 On the life insurer side, it is the
board of Assuris that meets directly with OSFI. The difference
exists because PACICC’s board of directors is partially
composed of members affiliated with P&C insurance
companies, whereas the PIRL committee members are not
affiliatedwith any PACICCmember company and can discuss
and share sensitive information with regulators.215 Once an
insurance regulator decides that a P&C insurer is experiencing
210 PACICC, “Why Insurers Fail”, supra note 33.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
214 Ibid at 2, specifying that the PIRL committee members are
exclusively public directors that are not affiliated with any PACICC
member companies.
215 Autorite´ des Marche´s Financiers, “Intervention Guidelines for
Quebec Chartered P&C Insurers and PACICC Member Compa-
nies” (April 2016) at 4, online (pdf): AMF 5https://lautorite.qc.ca/
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extreme financial distress, it invites PACICC to participate in
the process, but decision authority rests with the regulator.
PACICC staff and board members from the PIRL committee
will provide suggestions to the company and the regulator,
including how PACICC could become involved to support
recovery or resolution options for the troubled company.
Decisions to support a liquidation or other resolution must be
made by the full PACICC board. The regulator can explore
ideas with members of the PIRL committee but will need to
engage the full board if the company and the regulator seek to
secure a financial commitment by PACICC. If a troubled
insurer is put into liquidation, PACICC’s primary objective is
to protect policyholders.
PACICC has authority to assist if regulators and PACICC’s
board of directors determine that policyholders are at risk.
Specifically, PartXIofPACICC’sMemorandumofOperation
states that PACICC can take a number of steps prior to a
member insurer becoming a controlled P&C insurer or prior to
a winding-up order.216 PACICC can monitor, discuss and
gather information in respect of itsmember companies, subject
to maintaining the confidentiality of all information.217
fileadmin/lautorite/professionnels/assureurs/PC_Intervention_Gui-
delines.pdf4 [“AMF, ‘Intervention Guidelines’”].
216 PACICC, “Memorandum of Operation” (2007), online (pdf):
PACICC 5 http://www.pacicc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/
Memo-of-Operation.pdf4 [“PACICC, ‘MOO’”].
217 PACICC, “Why insurers fail”, supra note 33 at 16. PACICC,
“MOO”, ibid: “However ... this duty of confidentiality shall not
apply to any information which (i) was lawfully in the public
domain at the time of communication to the Corporation, (ii)
lawfully enters the public domain through no fault of the
Corporation subsequent to the time of communication to the
Corporation, (iii) was lawfully in the Corporation’s possession free
of any obligation of confidence at the time of communication to the
Corporation, (iv) was lawfully communicated to the Corporation
free of any obligation of confidence subsequent to the time of initial
communication to the Corporation, or (v) was lawfully commu-
nicated to any person free from any obligation of confidence
subsequent to the time of communication to the Corporation.”
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To quote from PACICC:
PACICC’s Memorandum of Operation (Section XI, paragraph 40) permits
the Board of Directors to take “reasonable steps” prior to a member being
ordered into wind-up if such steps are consistent with the Corporation’s
objectives. The Memorandum of Operation further clarifies that “reason-
able steps” include, “without limitation, assisting in the sale, transfer or
reinsurance of a book of business written by a member company,” and/or
“issuing guarantees or otherwise providing financial support.”218
It is unclear the extent towhich the PACICCboard could take
such steps if it does not have the information regarding a
financially distressed P&C insurer. Presumably the PIRL
could make a request to the board, but until the distress or
insolvency becomes known to the board, it may not have
sufficient information to make a decision to assist with
guarantees or other financial support. Even when there is
public knowledge, the board may not be able to access the
confidential information necessary to make an informed
decision on financial support. PACICC is currently in
discussions with the federal government to clarify its role.
While this article focuses primarily on federally-regulated
insurance companies, the provincial intervention regimes
operate similarly. For example, the AMF has an intervention
program for Que´bec regulated P&C insurance companies,
which is operated in collaboration with PACICC.219 The
intervention guidelines set out measures that can be
implemented by the AMF or PACICC when a Que´bec
chartered P&C insurer experiences difficulties that may
jeopardize its ability to meet its commitments to its
policyholders, claimants and other beneficiaries.220 The
stages of intervention are similar to OSFI’s except that
OSFI’s pre-stage is AMF’s stage 1. The stages of intervention
are: Stage 1 “No Significant Problems”, Stage 2 “Early
Warning”, Stage 3 “Watch Condition”, Stage 4 “Solvency
218 PACICC, “Why insurers fail”, supra note 33 at 18: Exit strategies of
P&C insurers in Canada.
219 AMF, “Intervention Guidelines”, supra note 215.
220 Ibid at 3.
Annual Review of Insolvency Law / 1025
Seriously Compromised”, and Stage 5 “Insufficient Assets or
Insolvent”.221 AMF’s guidelines apply to all P&C insurance
companies licensed to transact insurance business in Que´bec
and holding a charter issued by the province of Que´bec or by
another Canadian jurisdiction. These same levels of
intervention are applied by the AMF to life insurers, the
regulator working with Assuris in the same way as described
previously.
V. HOW CANADA’S INSURANCE SUPERVISORY
REGIME MEASURES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS
InCanada, there is no one resolution authority nationally for
all financial institutions, as has been recommended by the
Financial Stability Board (“FSB”).222 The FSB best practice
recommends that each jurisdiction should have a designated
administrative authority or authorities responsible for
exercising resolution powers over financial institutions;223
and that where there are multiple resolution authorities
within a jurisdiction, their respective mandates, roles and
responsibilities should be clearly defined and coordinated.
The FSB also specifies that where different resolution
authorities are in charge of resolving entities of the same
group within a single jurisdiction, the resolution regime of
that jurisdiction should identify a lead authority that
coordinates the resolution of the legal entities within the
jurisdiction. The FSB has reported that one gap in the
Canadian system is that there is the lack of explicit power to
221 Ibid at 3.
222 Financial Stability Board, “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution
Regimes for Financial Institutions” (15 October 2014) at 5-6, online:
FSB 5http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2014/10/r_141015/
44 [“FSB, ‘Key Attributes’”]; FSB, “Second Thematic Review on
Resolution Regimes” (18 March 2016), online: FSB 5http://
www.fsb.org/2016/03/second-thematic-review-on-resolution-re-
gimes/44 [“FSB, ‘Second Thematic Review’”]: part of the commit-
ment by FSB member countries to undergo periodic peer review.
223 FSB, “Key Attributes”, supra note 222.
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ensure continuity of shared services and functions by other
entities, whether or not regulated, within the same financial
group in resolution.224
The International Association of Insurance Supervisors
(“IAIS”) Insurance Core Principles (“ICP”) provide a
globally accepted framework for the supervision of the
insurance sector.225 The ICP objectives are to contribute to
the improved supervision of the insurance industry for the
protection of policyholders worldwide, to promote the
development of well-regulated insurance markets, and to
contribute to global financial stability.226
The core principles include powers that supervisors should
have to support the process of providing insurers with an
orderlyexit fromthemarket.The regulatory frameworkshould
address the increasing number of insurance groups and
financial conglomerates, and supervisors should collaborate
internationally to ensure that policyholders are protected,
markets remain stable, risk of contagion is reduced, and
supervisory gaps are avoided.227
OSFI has adopted the IAIS ICP as its source for detailed
supervisory standards and criteria. In particular, ICP 12
specifies that the legal framework should give priority to the
protection of policyholders and have, as a primary objective,
minimizing disruption to the timely provision of benefits to
224 FSB, “Second Thematic Review”, supra note 222.
225 IAIS, “Insurance Core Principles”, supra note 72. See also IAIS,
“About the IAIS” (2018), online: IAIS 5https://www.iaisweb.org/
page/about-the-iais/highlight=voluntary%20membership%20orga-
nization4: “The International Association of Insurance Supervisors
(IAIS) is a voluntary membership organization of insurance super-
visors and regulators from more than 200 jurisdictions in nearly 140
countries. The mission of the IAIS is to promote effective and
globally consistent supervision of the insurance industry in order to
develop and maintain fair, safe and stable insurance markets for the
benefit and protection of policyholders and to contribute to global
financial stability.”
226 IAIS, “Insurance Core Principles”, ibid.
227 Ibid at 4.
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policyholders.228 This objective is reflected in both OSFI
constating legislation and its supervisory framework, as
discussed earlier. While Canada measures relatively well
against the ICP, it is missing a few important elements. The
ICP state that the authority responsible for insurance
supervision and the objectives of insurance supervision must
be clearly defined.229 OSFI has powers to supervise, to issue
and enforce rules by administrativemeans and take immediate
action, andOSFI promotes themaintenance of a fair, safe and
stable insurance sector for the benefit and protection of
policyholders. However, the scope of its resolution authority
could be better defined, as it has not really acknowledged its
responsibility for solvent recovery/resolution, as discussed in
the next part.
The second core principle is that “the supervisor, in the exercise
of its functions and powers: is operationally independent,
accountable and transparent, protects confidential
information, has appropriate legal protection, has adequate
resources and meets high professional standards”.230 OSFI
generally meets this principle. It is unclear, based on the
publicly available information, whether there is effective
communication and prompt escalation of significant issues to
appropriate levels within OSFI such that required action is
immediatelyaddressed, as recommended in ICP2.1.OSFIdoes
exchange information with other relevant supervisors and
authorities subject to confidentiality requirements.231 It
228 Ibid, ICP 12 at 109-110.
229 Ibid, ICP 1 at 15-16.
230 Ibid, ICP 2 at 17-21. It also meets ICP 4 that legal entities that
engage in insurance activities must be licensed before they can
operate in Canada and the procedures for licensing must be clear,
objective and public, and consistently applied: ibid at 28; and ICP 5,
which requires that: “The supervisor requires Board Members,
Senior Management, Key Persons in Control Functions and
Significant Owners of an insurer to be and remain suitable to fulfil
their respective roles”: ibid at 35.
231 Ibid, ICP 3 at 23. IAIS reports that “Agreements such as the IAIS
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU) or bilateral
Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) facilitate information exchange
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approves proposals to acquire significant ownership or control
changes through merger or other means.232
OSFI meets the IAIS core principle of requiring insurers to
establish and implement a corporate governance framework
that provides soundandprudentmanagement andoversight of
the insurer’s business and adequately recognizes and protects
the interests ofpolicyholders.233OSFI requires insurers tohave
in place effective systems of risk management and internal
controls, including effective functions for risk management,
compliance, actuarial matters and internal audit, as
recommended in ICP 8.234 As with the core principle on
supervisory review and reporting, OSFI has a risk-based
approach to supervision that uses both off-sitemonitoring and
on-site inspections to examine the business of each insurer,
evaluate its condition, risk profile and conduct, the quality and
effectiveness of its corporate governance and its compliance
with relevant legislation and supervisory requirements.235
IAIS ICP10 suggests that:
The insurance supervisor has sufficient authority and ability, including the
availability of adequate instruments, to take timely preventive and
corrective measures if the insurer fails to operate in a manner that is
consistent with sound business practices or regulatory requirements. There
is a range of actions or remedial measures which include allowing for
early intervention when necessary. Preventive and corrective measures are
applied commensurate with the severity of the insurer’s problems.236
As noted earlier, OSFI meets this principle, also enforcing
corrective action where needed.237 OSFI has established
because they provide the basis for a two-way flow of information and
the basis on which supervisors can rely on the information they
exchange with other supervisors being treated as confidential.”
232 Ibid, ICP 6 at 43.
233 Ibid, ICP 7 at 46.
234 Ibid, ICP 8 at 70.
235 Ibid, ICP 9 at 93.
236 Ibid, ICP 10 at 105.
237 Based on clear and objective criteria that are publicly disclosed: ICP
11, ibid at 107. ICP 12 specifies: “The legislation defines a range of
options for the exit of insurance legal entities from the market. It
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requirements for the valuation of assets and liabilities for
solvency purposes.238 Both the ICA and OSFI establish
requirements for solvency purposes on the investment
activities of insurers, in order to address the risks faced by
insurers; and Canada’s supervisory framework establishes
enterprise risk management requirements for solvency
purposes that require insurers to address relevant and
material risks.239 OSFI meets the core principle of
establishing capital adequacy requirements for solvency
purposes and provides for degrees of supervisory
intervention.240
defines insolvency and establishes the criteria and procedure for
dealing with insolvency of insurance legal entities. In the event of
winding-up proceedings of insurance legal entities”: ibid at 109. ICP
13: “The supervisor requires the insurer to manage effectively its use
of reinsurance and other forms of risk transfer. The supervisor takes
into account the nature of reinsurance business when supervising
reinsurers based in its jurisdiction”: ibid at 111.
238 Ibid, ICP 14 at 126.
239 Ibid, ICP 15 and 16 at 145 and 160.
240 Ibid, ICP 17 at 193. OSFI also meets ICP 18: “The supervisor sets
and enforces requirements for the conduct of insurance intermedi-
aries, in order that they conduct business in a professional and
transparent manner”: ibid at 264. ICP 19 specifies: “The supervisor
requires that insurers and intermediaries, in their conduct of
insurance business, treat customers fairly, both before a contract
is entered into and through to the point at which all obligations
under a contract have been satisfied”: ibid at 287. ICP 20 states:
“The supervisor requires insurers to disclose relevant, comprehen-
sive and adequate information on a timely basis in order to give
policyholders and market participants a clear view of their business
activities, performance and financial position. This is expected to
enhance market discipline and understanding of the risks to which
an insurer is exposed and the manner in which those risks are
managed”: ibid at 313. ICP 21: “The supervisor requires that
insurers and intermediaries take effective measures to deter,
prevent, detect, report and remedy fraud in insurance:” ibid at
337. ICP 22: “The supervisor requires insurers and intermediaries to
take effective measures to combat money laundering and the
financing of terrorism. In addition, the supervisor takes effective
measures to combat money laundering and the financing of
terrorism”: ibid at 344.
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OSFI has adopted a number of other IAIS ICP. In cooperation
and coordination with other supervisors domestically and
internationally, OSFI identifies multinational insurance
groups and the appropriate scope of group supervision.241
OSFI identifies, monitors and analyses market and financial
developments and other environmental factors that may
impact insurers and insurance markets and shares this
information with other relevant authorities subject to
confidentiality requirements.242 Further, OSFI cooperates
and coordinates with other relevant supervisors and
authorities such that a cross-border insolvency of an insurer
can be managed.243
However, the FSB has recommended that national
governments grant broad powers to a national resolution
authority to resolve systemically important financial
institutions (“SIFI”), including systemically important
insurers.244 While no insurer in Canada has yet to be declared
one of the global SIFI, there are, as noted earlier, three major
conglomerates that account for the vast majority of insurer
activity in Canada, and the failure of any of these insurers
would be significant. Thus, the resolution authority must be as
clearaspossible.245Yet there is a lackof clarityonhowmultiple
resolution and policy protection authorities in Canada would
coordinate oversight and intervention with the failure of a
major financial conglomerate that had insurance brokerage
and other cross-sector businesses.
241 Ibid, ICP 23 at 354.
242 Ibid, ICP 24 and 25 at 361 and 365.
243 Ibid, ICP 26 at 401.
244 Financial Stability Board, “Addressing SIFIs” (2017), online: FSB
5http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/policy-development/systemati-
cally-important-financial-institutions-sifis/4: “Systemically impor-
tant financial institutions (SIFI) are financial institutions whose
distress or disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and
systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to
the wider financial system and economic activity.” For a discussion,
see Sarra, “Bridge Over Troubled Waters”, supra note 74.
245 See the discussion in the next part of possible legislative reform.
Annual Review of Insolvency Law / 1031
There are 26 IAIS core insurance principles andmore than 400
pages of recommendations and sub-principles, as well as the
appendices of the FSB Key Attributes that apply to insurers.
While it isbeyondthe scopeof thisarticle toassessOSFIagainst
all of them, it is evident that Canada’s supervisory framework
measures relatively well when compared to the primary core
principles. However, there are gaps in Canada that should be
addressed.
VI. WHATPARTOF “FLOTATION”OFTHERESOLUTION
REGIME FOR INSURERS STILL REQUIRES
LEGISLATIVE REFORM?
The insurance supervisory and policyholder protection
regimes in Canada are relatively comprehensive. Assuris
observes that experience with the previous four failures of life
insurers demonstrates that the tools exist to resolve the failure
of any size of life insurer in Canada.246 PACICC has also
observed that the system can respond to failures in which
claims could amount to up to $25 billion with no impact
expected on the solvency of well-run healthy insurers.247
However, there are gaps in the resolution regime that could
easily be remedied with legislative reform. The WURA is in
need of an overhaul to bring it into a modern insolvency
framework. There have been many suggestions for its reform
over the years.248 PACICC observes, for example, that the
246 Assuris, “Submission to Department of Finance Canada on
Positioning Canada’s Financial Sector for the Future” (9 November
2016), online (pdf): Government of Canada 5https://www.fin.gc.-
ca/consultresp/pdf-ssge-sefc/ssge-sefc-07.pdf4. Assuris, “Submis-
sion to Department of Finance Canada on Positioning Canada’s
Financial Sector for the Future” (2017), online (pdf): Government
of Canada 5https://www.fin.gc.ca/consultresp/pdf-pssge-psefc/
pssge-psefc-16.pdf4 [“Assuris, ‘Positioning Canada’s Financial
Sector for the Future 2017’”].
247 PACICC 2016, supra note 207.
248 See for example, Assuris 2017, supra note 11; PACICC 2016, supra
note 207; Sarra and Dunning, supra note 194; Gordon Dunning,
James D Gage and Geoff R Hall, “A Matter of Life and Death: Life
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WURA was not designed to address catastrophic events, such
as a major earthquake, which could pose solvency risks for
numerous P&C insurers and hinder payments to
policyholders.249 This part addresses three of the most urgent
areas in need of reform: clarifying the resolution authority,
improving treatment of derivatives, and facilitating cross-
border insolvencies.
1. Reform of OSFIA and WURA to Enshrine Resolution
Objectives and Mechanisms
The largest gap is with solvent resolution, in terms of who has
authority and the transparency of the process. Assuris has
observed that “there is no authority in Canada with a clearly
defined role to assess and improve the resolvability of life
insurance companies in Canada”.250 PACICC has reported
that the “process of liquidating a failed insurer can take 15 to 20
years to complete, and is expensive to administer”, calling for
reform of WURA to create timelier processes.251 Improving
resolvability of financially distressed insurers will enhance the
system’s overall objectives of a timely and effective resolution
process, and will protect against unnecessary losses to
policyholders and creditors.
Arguably, OSFI already has sufficient authority under the
ICA, WURA and its own constating statute, OSFIA, to
resolve insurer financial distress on a solvent basis or on an
insurer’s insolvency, but to date it has said that it does not
have that authority for solvent recovery/resolution, leaving a
legislative gap.252 Unlike the Canada Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“CDIC”), an arm’s-length government-
Insurance Companies and the Meaning of ‘Insolvency’ under the
Winding-Up Act and Restructuring Act”, in Janis P Sarra and B E
Romaine, eds, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2012 (Toronto:
Carswell, 2013) at 335.
249 PACICC 2016, supra note 207.
250 Assuris 2017, supra note 11.
251 PACICC 2016, supra note 207.
252 OSFIA, supra note 60. Assuris 2017, supra note 11 at 2.
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appointed body that has been designated as the resolution
authority for federally-regulated banks,253 there is no
authority in Canada that is responsible for assessing and
deciding whether or not an insurer is resolvable.254 The
systemdepends on co-operation betweenmultiple bodies, the
process of which is not always transparent or certain. Assuris
has expertise in insurer resolution and, through court order,
can be granted some powers to resolve.255 The lack of clarity
of the statutory language is problematic. For example,
Confederation Life had a trust company subsidiary. In the
months before Confederation Life’s failure, assets were
transferred between the life company and the trust
company to rebalance the capital position of the
companies. These transfers changed the potential recovery
rate between the policyholders and depositors.Without clear
guidelines on which pre-insolvency transactions were
reviewable, there was considerable uncertainty, delay, and a
high risk of protracted litigation.256
The lackof claritybetween the respective rolesof the supervisor
and the policy protection funds could easily be remedied by
designatingOSFI as the sole resolution authority for federally-
regulated insurers. Assuris and PACICC can offer their
expertise in assessing recovery/resolvability plans, not unlike
senior secured lenders do in corporate resolution and
restructuring plans, but the industry funded and nominated
boards of Assuris and PACICC are not the appropriate bodies
253 Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, RSC 1985, c C-3, as
amended [CDICA]. Canada Budget Implementation Act, 2017, No 1,
SC 2017, c 20, amending the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation
Act, RSC 1985, c C-3, as amended and the Bank Act, SC 1991, c 46.
Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation, “CDIC is formally desig-
nated as Canada’s resolution authority” (22 June 2017), online:
CDIC 5http://www.cdic.ca/en/newsroom/newsreleases/Pages/cdic-
is-formally-designated-as-canada-resolution-authority.aspx4.
254 Assuris 2017, supra note 11 at 2.
255 Assuris, “Positioning Canada’s Financial Sector for the Future
2017”, supra note 246 at 5.
256 Sarra and Dunning, supra note 194 at 165-166.
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to make responsible for resolution. A sole authority is also
better for the stability of the system, in that distressed insurers
have certainty regarding supervisory oversight.
The provisions of the ICA and the WURA could be
strengthened by setting out a range of resolution strategies
that OSFI could utilize and by clarifying the roles of Assuris
and PACICC at various key points in the process.257
Another aspect is to make clear that an insolvency professional
canbeappointedunder either the ICAor theWURA to facilitate
going-concern or solvent recovery/resolution. Such provisions
have been very successfully deployed in processes pursuant to
the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) and the Companies’
CreditorsArrangementAct(CCAA),with theexpressobjectives
of facilitating, where possible, a viable going-forward business
plan for thedistressed companyandmaximizing the valueof the
company for the benefit of all stakeholders.258
There is a highly-skilled professional community in Canada
already, with accountancy, valuation, restructuring and
liquidation skills. The statutory language should allow for
timelyappointmentof suchprofessionals,with theabilityof the
court to order priority charges to cover the fees and
disbursements of the professional. The insolvency/
restructuring professional, as a court-appointed officer,
would have the obligation to balance the interests of all the
stakeholders, as well as the public interest, in discerning
strategies to address the insurer’s financial situation.259 The
professional can provide the debtor insurer’s directors, OSFI,
Assuris and/or PACICC with an independent and informed
assessmentof the likelihoodof successful resolutionor theneed
for winding-up and liquidation. Use of such professionals can
257 Assuris 2017, supra note 11 at 2.
258 BIA, supra note 37; Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC
1985, c C-36, as amended [CCAA].
259 For a discussion of this role in the corporate contest, see Janis P
Sarra, Rescue! The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, 2nd ed
(Toronto: Carswell, 2013).
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facilitate timely resolution of insurer financial distress or
insolvency, which in turn minimizes negative impact on the
industry and helps maintain confidence in the soundness and
stability of insurers and the policyholder protection scheme.260
Elsewhere, I have suggested that there is a riskof fragmentation
in approaches to resolution where the distressed financial
institution is part of a conglomerate with multiple entities and
financial services, as there is no one authority that can
expeditiously monitor and resolve financial conglomerates
covering several types of financial institutions.261 One change
that Parliament could enact now is to clarify which entity is the
lead macroprudential authority when there is a conglomerate
failure.262
Several measures could enhance the insurance resolution
regime and align it more directly with international
standards. It is important to appreciate the difference
between recoverability planning, meaning strategies to
remedy the deficiencies identified by OSFI and Assuris or
PACICC, and resolution plans, which are the more formal
intervention by supervisory authorities when the insurer has
not remedied deficiencies and insolvency is present or
imminent. In both instances, it is very important that both
the insurer and the oversight authority understand the risks
associated with recovery or resolution strategies.
Recommendations
1. OSFI could be expressly declared the recovery and
resolution authority for insurers under the ICA and/
or WURA for both solvent and insolvent insurers.
Such authority should include:
i. issuing a clear guide to the process of assessing and
improving resolvability of insurers, including
260 Assuris 2017, supra note 11 at 2.
261 Sarra, “Bridge Over Troubled Waters”, supra note 74 at 329-330.
262 Ibid.
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revising the intervention stages to facilitate solvent
recovery and resolution plans;263
ii. authorizing OSFI to require an insurer to prepare
and disclose information regarding risks in
resolution;264
iii. authorizing OSFI to assess recoverability/resol-
vability of Canadian insurers and take timely
and corrective action to resolve insurers where
needed, in order to minimize losses to policy-
holders;
iv. authorizing OSFI to require an insurer to prepare
and disclose information that will enable assess-
ment of resolvability, and if needed, prepare a
resolution plan;265
v. authorizing OSFI to require an insurer to appoint
a restructuring professional to monitor progress
of a recovery plan or to coordinate a solvent
resolution if a recovery plan fails, to be under-
taken in consultation with, on recommendation
of, Assuris or PACICC;266
vi. authorizing OSFI to seek appointment of a chief
restructuring officer where the circumstances
warrant, to implement a resolution plan;
vii. authorizing appointment of the same insolvency
or restructuring professional to serve as liqui-
dator if the attempt at going-concern resolution
fails, in order to save the time and expense of
263 Essentially expanding the scope and clarity of OSFI’s OSFI, “Guide
to Intervention for Federally Regulated Life Insurance Compa-
nies”, supra note 147.
264 Assuris 2017, supra note 11 at 15, which observes: “OSFI does not
currently require insurers to plan for contingencies based on their
risks in resolution”.
265 Assuris 2017, supra note 11 at 2.
266 Ibid at 4.
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converting the process from recovery to liquida-
tion;267 and
viii. ensuring procedural safeguards for the financially
distressed or insolvent insurer in terms of notice
and the ability to object to the court.
2. The WURA could be amended to clarify the role of
Assuris and PACICC, as major stakeholders, in
identifying financial distress and being consulted on
the best options for recovery, solvent resolution or
winding-up. Both policyholder protection funds have
considerable contingent liabilities on failure of an
insurer and have acquired considerable skill and
expertise in monitoring their member insurer institu-
tions. While cooperation currently exists, it would be
enhanced by clarifying their access to information,
consultation within the decision process role, and any
limits on that role in an enhanced resolution regime.
3. Internationally active insurance groups (“IAIG”)268
should be required to prepare recovery plans that
would give supervisors the information required to
assess whether or not a corporate group could be
resolved rather than liquidated. Assuris and PA-
CICC should be consulted when the OSFI or
another supervisor is assessing the resolvability of
an IAIG.269
267 Ibid at 3.
268 Defined by the IAIS to be “a large, internationally active group that
includes at least one sizeable insurance entity”: IAIS, “Frequently
Asked Questions for The IAIS Common Framework for the Super-
vision of Internationally Active Insurance Groups (ComFrame)” (21
July 2017), online: IAIS 5https://www.iaisweb.org/file/67671/ics-
frequently-asked-questions-21-july-20174; see also IAIS, “IAIS re-
leases overall ComFrame including ICS Version 2.0 for public
consultation” (31 July 2018), online: IAIS5https://www.iaisweb.org/
news/iais-releases-overall-comframe-including-ics-version-20-for-pub-
lic-consultation4 [“IAIS, ‘ComFrame Consultation’”].
269 Assuris, “Positioning Canada’s Financial Sector for the Future
2017”, supra note 246 at 2.
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4. All insurers should provide critically important resolu-
tion information that can allow the supervisors and the
policyholder protection organizations to assess resolva-
bility, including the market value of assets and
liabilities, material inter-company agreements and the
jurisdictional location of assets.270
5. Where issues are identified, insurers should be required
to improve their recoverability or resolvability well in
advance of being staged by OSFI for more aggressive
intervention.
6. If either total loss-absorbent capacity or resolvability
is in doubt, companies should be required to prepare a
resolution plan.271
7. A liquidator should be allowed to apply to the court to
abridge the notice period to allow sale of the insolvent
insurer’s business portfolio to another insurer, where
sale of the whole book of business early in the
liquidation process protects policyholders and the
stability and confidence in financial markets.272
8. The WURA should be amended to provide at least the
same protections as employees and pensioners receive
under Canadian bankruptcy legislation and theWEPPA.
2. Derivatives and Other Eligible Financial Contracts
Derivatives are used frequently by insurers tohedge risk and to
undertake portfolio management.273 They are beneficial
270 Ibid.
271 Ibid, Assuris suggesting that resolution plans should not be
routinely required because of the time and expense and because it
may detract from insurers’ core business.
272 Insolvency Institute of Canada, “Report of the Task Force on
Derivatives” (2013) at 11, online (pdf): IIC 5https://www.insol-
vency.ca/en/iicresources/resources/IIC_Derivatives_Task_Force_R-
eport_November_2013.pdf4 [“IIC Task Force”].
273 IAIS and World Bank, “ICP 22B: The Use of Derivatives by
Insurers” (2006) at 2-3, online (pdf): IAIS 5https://www.iaiswe-
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where they lower the cost of transferring or hedging risk and
alleviate high concentrations of risk in an insurer’s business.
The liquidity of interest rate swaps make them a cost-effective
tool for risk transfer; and derivatives can facilitate the netting
of risks across financial institutions and financial markets.274
Interest rate swaps can be used to increase or decrease interest
rate exposures, to hedge specific balance sheet assets and
liabilities, to expand investment opportunities, and/or to
manage an asset portfolio.275 Insurers often hedge risk
exposures as a result of price fluctuations that are incidental
to their business operations byusing derivatives to fix the price
of future purchases and sales and future exchange rates.276
The risks of derivatives are linked directly to the size and price
volatility of the cash flows that the derivatives occasion on
settling, and only indirectly to the face amount of the
underlying asset or index; and derivative risks can be
offsetting, which is not immediately apparent when looking
at the face value of the derivative.277 The IAIS has observed:
Prudent derivative best practices will vary from insurer to insurer,
depending on the range and complexity of derivative products and
strategies employed and the frequency, volume, and objectives of their
usage. The board and senior management must be actively involved with
derivative risk management. Permitted derivative strategies and usage
must be tightly constrained to ensure that derivative transactions are
always suitable. Prudential derivative risk management is tied to and
b.org/modules/cciais/assets/files/pdf/061002_ICP_22B_The_U-
se_of_Derivatives_by_Insurers.pdf4.
274 Ibid.
275 Ibid at 14. See also ibid at 8: “Bond futures may be bought to hedge
the interest rate risk associated with future premiums that will be
received in an interest rate environment different from that in which
the liability was priced and sold.”
276 Ibid at 5. This article does not address the issues associated with
using derivatives as speculation or for arbitrage purposes, which
raise a number of concerns.
277 Ibid at 19: “[A]n insurer’s derivative exposures are frequently
expressed in terms of the dollar amount of the underlying asset or
index to which the derivative is linked (the face amount, contract
amount, or amount of notional principal). Face amount measures
transaction volume, not credit or market risk.”
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integrated with prudential risk management of cash-market investments.
The prudent credit, market, and other risk management practices and
policies of end users differ from those of market makers.278
The IAIS observes that derivatives “can be used prudently to
manage risk, or they can be used imprudently to leverage risk”
and that “derivative policies and practices should be designed
to ensure compliance and audited to confirm compliance and
the accuracy and reliability of reports and financial
accounts”.279 “In monitoring the activities of insurers
involved in derivatives, the supervisory authority must satisfy
itself that insurers have the ability to recognize, measure, and
prudently manage the risks associated with their use.”280 The
core principles suggest that “the supervisory authority requires
that insurers have in place adequate internal controls to ensure
that derivatives activities are properly overseen and that ...
rigorous audit procedures ... ensure the timely identification of
internal control weaknesses and/or operating system
deficiencies”.281
278 Ibid at 21. It suggests: “Supervisors should ensure that insurers
manage their derivative credit exposures consistently with how they
manage their cash-market credit exposures. Specifically, the credit
decision process, procedures, controls, limits, review, and reports
for derivatives should be both consistent and integrated with those
for cash-market investments.”
279 Ibid at 29.
280 Ibid at 33, citing ICP 22, explanatory note 5.
281 Ibid at 30-31, citing ICP 22, essential criteria f and i: “ICP 22,
essential criterion i, says, ‘The supervisory authority requires that
insurers have in place rigorous audit procedures that include
coverage of their derivatives activities’”. See also ibid at 33: “ICP 22,
explanatory note 5, says, ‘In monitoring the activities of insurers
involved in derivatives, the supervisory authority must satisfy itself
that insurers have the ability to recognize, measure, and prudently
manage the risks associated with their use. The supervisory
authority should obtain sufficient information on insurers’ policies
and procedures on the use of derivatives and may request
information on the purpose for which particular derivatives are to
be used and the rationale’”; ibid at 33, citing ICP 22, explanatory
note 5, also encourages supervisors to “request information on the
purpose for which particular derivatives are used and the rationale
for undertaking particular transactions”. See also ibid at 37: “The
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Derivatives raise many issues, but two are critically important
when thinking about insurers in Canada. The first is to ensure
that regulators are appropriately supervising their use and the
second is to consider enacting a statutory stay on their settling
for a limited period when an insurer enters insolvency
proceedings.
Derivatives fall within the definition of eligible financial
contracts (“EFC”) in Canada. EFC are not stayed on insurer
insolvency.282 Concern was expressed after the height of the
global financial crisis that the initiationof a resolutionprocess
could trigger the simultaneous closing out of large volumes of
derivative contracts.283 The exercise of such contractual
rights, often under the ISDA Master Agreement,284 could
destabilize financial markets and undermine the orderly
resolution of financial institutions.
supervisor should pay close attention to the suitability of deriva-
tives, if a high volume or large, complex, and unusual derivatives
are involved.”
282 Nor are they stayed under corporate insolvency because “safe
harbours” under the BIA and CCAA exempt EFC from the stay of
proceedings to permit the termination of EFC by the solvent
counterparty. The IIC observes that the main purposes of the EFC
safe harbours are to protect non-defaulting counterparties from the
risk of increasing exposure to the insolvent counterparty under the
EFC and to reduce systemic risk in Canadian and global financial
markets. Non-defaulting counterparties may be at risk because, in
certain instances, the amounts under the EFC are very substantial
and the value of the underlying products subject to EFC are volatile
in nature and can change dramatically during an insolvency
proceeding. Safe harbours can delay certain liabilities of the
insolvent entity from being crystallized. IIC Task Force, supra note
272 at 2-3.
283 For a discussion, see Sarra, “Bridge Over Troubled Waters”, supra
note 74. See also Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(“BCBS”), “Report and recommendations of the Cross-border Bank
Resolution Group” (March 2010) at 40-41, online: Bank for
International Settlements 5http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.htm4.
284 International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc, “ISDA
Master Agreement” (2002), online: ISDA 5https://www.isda.org/
book/2002-isda-master-agreement-english/4.
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The introduction of central counterparties (“CCP”) as
intermediaries, aimed at guaranteeing that the obligations of
derivatives trades will be honoured, even if one participant
defaults,mayhave reduced the risksassociatedwithheightened
counterparty risk in the market. CCP interpose themselves
between sellers and purchasers of derivatives, reducing risk by
becoming the counterparty to all transactions. CCP, if well-
funded, with standardized over-the-counter (“OTC”)
derivatives contracts, strict risk-control systems, and
appropriate regulatory oversight, can assist in reducing
counterparty exposures, creating more certainty. CCP can
impose some discipline in the market in terms of valuation,
enhance netting and closing out of derivatives. At the same
time, greater use of central counterparty clearing, including
mandatoryclearingof standardizedOTCderivatives, is leading
to a significant increase in the volume of trades cleared and
creatingmuch larger exposures for certainCCPtomanage.The
Bank ofCanada has observed that CCPmust have robust risk-
management controls that cover expected losses and liquidity
shortfallswithaveryhighdegreeof confidence, andpre-funded
resources should be in place to cover the losses arising from the
default of the single largest participant.285 There are many
285 If these resources are exhausted, the CCP will implement its
recovery plan and call on its participants to contribute additional
resources, as defined in this plan, and may also contribute
additional resources itself. The Bank of Canada is the resolution
authority for financial market infrastructures (“FMI”) such as
CCP. The powers and tools available to the Bank are aimed at
allowing it to take timely actions to continue to provide the FMI’s
critical payment clearing and settlement services to its participants
and the financial system more broadly; facilitate the timely
settlement of obligations of the FMI; allocate any losses that have
not yet been covered; and replenish the FMI’s resources to meet its
regulatory requirements. Bank of Canada, “Establishing a Resolu-
tion Regime for Canada’s Financial Market Infrastructures”, Bank
of Canada Financial System Review, June 2018, online (pdf):
5https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/fsr-
june18-woodman.pdf4. See also MMueller and A Usche, “Toward
More Resilient Markets: Over-the-Counter Derivatives Reform in
Canada”, Bank of Canada Financial System Review, December
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issues raised by these developments, includingCanada reliance
onoff-shoreCCPandover-concentrationof risk in singleCCP.
While beyond the scope of this article, these issues are
incredibly important for the safety and soundness of the
insurer recovery/resolution regime and deserve further public
policy attention.
The closingoutofEFCcanprejudicean insolvent insurer if it is
“in-the-money”, as it could realize on the value of the EFC for
the benefit of policyholders and creditors. Even where the
insurer is out-of-the-money, it is important to crystallize
claims against the estate of the insurer as part of an effective
and timely liquidation and winding-up process.
One solution is to authorize resolution authorities to
temporarily stay the operation of early termination clauses in
order to complete transfer of derivatives to a bridge institution
or another solvent entity. Any stay needs to balance protection
of both counterparties to the derivatives aswell as consider any
systemic risks to an inability to close-out the contracts.286
EFC are temporarily stayed on an extremely limited basis for
insolvent banks in Canada.287 Such a stay is aimed at
2016, 53-65. Canadian-dollar OTC derivative contracts have a
notional outstanding value of just under $9 trillion; T Lane,
“Curbing Contagion: Options and Challenges for Building More
Robust Financial Market Infrastructure”, Bank of Canada, 2011,
online: 5https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2011/09/curbing-conta-
gion-options-and-challenges/4.
286 If the stay is too long, there is risk of rapid deterioration of the value
of the contract: IIC Task Force, supra note 272 at 3.
287 A counterparty of an EFC cannot terminate, amend, accelerate or
forfeit a term under the contract by reason only of the bank’s
insolvency or deteriorated financial condition during the period
beginning when an order is made appointing the CDIC as receiver
of the distressed bank or an order is made directing incorporation of
a bridge bank, and ending on the following business day at 5:00 pm.
Sections 39.15(7), (7.01), (7.1), CDICA, supra note 253. Any
stipulation in an EFC is of no force if it has the effect of providing
for or permitting anything that is contrary to provisions of CDICA,
with the exception that it does not apply in respect of an EFC
between the bank and a clearing house. The stay does not prevent a
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encouraging a going-concern resolution where possible, but
even during a liquidation process, a liquidator can use the
period of the stay to realize on some valuable assets for the
benefitof creditorsandother stakeholders.While this stay is for
a very short period,288 it does allow CDIC, as resolution
authority, a very brief period to determine which EFC it will
adopt, where the bank is in-the-money, whichEFC to assign to
a bridge bank or third party, and which to terminate.289
member of the Canadian Payments Association from ceasing to act
as a clearing agent for a federal member institution in accordance
with the Payment Clearing and Settlement Act, SC 1996, c 6, ss
39.15(3.2), (3.3) and the Canadian Payments Act, RSC 1985, c C-21,
s 39.15(3). However, where CDIC gives an undertaking to provide
the financial assistance that the institution needs in order to
discharge its obligations to the clearing house as they become due,
the clearing house is to continue to act in that capacity for the bank.
If an EFC is assigned to or assumed by a bridge bank or a third
party, CDIC must assign all of the bank’s obligations arising from
the EFC, and the bridge bank or third party must assume those
obligations. The failed bank’s interest or right in property that
secures its obligations under the EFC is transferred to that bridge
institution or the third party; ss 39.15(7), (7.2), (7.3), CDICA, supra
note 253.
288 Ibid.
289 For a discussion, see Sarra, “Bridge Over Troubled Waters”, supra
note 74.
Section 39.15 of CDICA, supra note 253 specifies:
(7) Nothing in subsection (1), (2) or (2.1) prevents the following
actions from being taken in accordance with the provisions of an
eligible financial contract: (a) the termination or amendment of the
contract; (b) the accelerated payment or forfeiture of the term under
the contract; (c) the exercise of remedies for a failure to satisfy an
obligation under or in connection with the contract, including the
payment of an amount payable — or the delivery of property
deliverable — under or in connection with the contract; (d) the
netting or setting off or compensation of an amount payable under
or in connection with the contract; (e) any dealing with financial
collateral (i) to satisfy an amount payable — or the delivery of
property deliverable — under or in connection with the contract, (ii)
for the purpose of calculating an amount payable under or in
connection with the contract by way of netting, setting off or
compensation of the financial collateral or application of the
proceeds or value of the financial collateral, or
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There is also common law precedent for a stay — during the
Confederation Life liquidation in 1994, the liquidator
obtained court approval of a one-week stay on EFC, which
allowed it to collect $400 million in value from
counterparties.290 However, this decision predated the
amendment that excluded EFC from the stay provisions of
theWURA and likely precipitated the amendment.
(7.01) For the purposes of paragraphs (7)(e) and (f), dealings with
financial collateral include (a) the sale or foreclosure or, in Quebec,
the surrender of financial collateral; and (b) the netting, setting off
or compensation of financial collateral or the application of the
proceeds or value of financial collateral.
(7.1) If an order is made under subsection 39.13(1), the actions
referred to in paragraphs (7)(a), (b) and (f) are not to be taken by
reason only of (a) the insolvency or deteriorated financial condition
of the federal member institution, any of its affiliates or any of its
providers of credit support or guarantors in respect of the
institution’s obligations under the eligible financial contract; (b)
the assignment or assumption of the eligible financial contract to or
by a bridge institution or a third party; (c) the making of the order
or any change of control or ownership of the federal member
institution or any of its affiliates that is related to the making of the
order; (d) a conversion under subsection 39.2(2.3) in respect of the
federal member institution; or (e) a conversion of any of the federal
member institution’s shares or liabilities in accordance with the
contractual terms of those shares or liabilities.
(7.101) If the Corporation considers that all or substantially all of
the federal member institution’s assets will be transferred to a third
party and that an eligible financial contract of that institution will
not be assigned to a third party, it may give notice to that effect to
the parties to that contract, in which case paragraphs (7.1)(a) and
(c) cease to apply in respect of that contract at the date and time the
notice is issued.
290 The Attorney General of Canada and Confederation Life Insurance
Company, Court File RE 4315/94, Order of Justice Houlden,
Ontario Court of Justice (Gen Div) 15 August 1994 at para 22(d). In
the Matter of Confederation Life Insurance Company, Court File RE
4315/94, Order of Justice Houlden, Ontario Court of Justice (Gen
Div) 15 August 1994. Interview, 21 August 2017, liquidator KPMG,
[on file with author].
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Potential reforms
1. Consider amending theWURA to impose a limited stay
period on counterparties to EFC held by insolvent
insurers to allow a court-appointed officer (restructur-
ing professional or liquidator) time to assess the value of
the EFC, whether the debtor insurer is in- or out-of-the-
money, and whether EFC should be transferred to one
or more third parties,
2. Consider amending the WURA to allow a restructur-
ing professional or a liquidator appointed pursuant to
WURA 30 days to apply to court to disclaim an EFC
on notice to the solvent counterparty.
i. The right to disclaim would not apply to any EFC
transactions that have been cleared.
ii. The disclaimer of EFC should be permitted only
where all EFC with the same solvent counterparty
are also disclaimed, and WURA could be
amended to align in this respect with the
CDICA291 to prevent the insolvent insurer from
terminating only in-the-money contracts with the
solvent party and impair the netting of obliga-
tions under other EFC with the same counter-
party.
iii. The solvent counterparty should be able to object
in court to the disclaimer on the same grounds as
291 CDICA, supra note 253, s 39.15(7.2) “Subject to subsection (7.21),
the Corporation may assign to a bridge institution or a third party
eligible financial contracts — including any claim under such
contracts — that are between a federal member institution and an
entity or any of the following entities if the Corporation assigns all
of those eligible financial contracts to the bridge institution or the
third party: (a) another entity that is controlled — directly or
indirectly — by the entity; (b) another entity that controls —
directly or indirectly — the entity; or (c) another entity that is
controlled — directly or indirectly — by the entity referred to in
paragraph (b).”
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for the disclaimer of other contracts under the
BIA.292
3. Consider amending theWURA to allow the liquidator
of an insolvent insurer, on notice to the counterparty,
to apply to the court for an order assigning an EFC
pursuant to the process provided for the assignment of
contracts in the CCAA and BIA.293
i. Assignment of EFC should be permitted only where
all EFC with the same solvent counterparty are
assigned.294
ii. The right to seek court approval of an assignment
of an EFC would not apply to any EFC
transactions that have been cleared.295
4. Consider amending theWURA to allow the sale of EFC
in an enhanced sale process as suggested in the previous
recommendation on sales.
5. Consider amending theWURA to render ineffective any
provisions in an EFC that have the effect of providing
for or permitting anything that is, in substance,
equivalent to a walk-away clause.296
292 IIC Task Force, supra note 272 at 5.
293 Ibid at 6; the Task Force recommending that the “non-defaulting
counterparty should not be permitted to terminate an EFC from the
date the court makes an order assigning the EFC or such later date
as may be set by the court” and “Cherry-picking of EFCs to be
assigned should be expressly forbidden and all contracts associated
with an assigned EFC should be required to be assigned as well”.
294 Ibid at 11.
295 Ibid.
296 Ibid at 12: a walk away clause, relatively rare, affords one
counterparty to an EFC the right to walk away from a termination
payment that would otherwise be due to the other counterparty
when the second counterparty commits certain specified defaults,
including becoming subject to insolvency proceedings. The Task
Force reports: “OSFI’s capital adequacy requirements require
certain financial institutions to disregard EFC that include walk-
away clauses for purposes of measuring the financial institution’s
regulatory capital and calculating netting”. The Task Force notes at
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3. Enact Cross-Border Resolution Provisions
Another important issue is in respect of the lacuna in cross-
border resolution provisions. Where a Canadian resolution
authority is seeking endorsement of insurer resolution in a
foreign jurisdiction, it cannot take advantage of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency,297 as
financial institutions havebeen excluded from thoseprovisions
in the majority of jurisdictions that have enacted the Model
Law. Canadian courts recognized the need for comity and
cooperation before adopting provisions of the Model Law in
Canada, and it is likely that they would advance those
objectives where a cross-border insolvent insurer sought
recognition, but the legislation could be clarified in this
respect, particularly as some of Canada’s largest trading
partners are shifting to a much more nationalistic approach
to cross-border relations.
On the “in-bound side” of an insolvency of a multinational
insurer, where a Canadian court is being asked to recognize a
foreignor cross-border insurer resolutionplan, theremaybean
issue as to who would serve in a role similar to a court-
appointed officer, to provide the Canadian court with an
informed opinion as to the fairness and reasonableness ofwhat
the court is being asked to approve.
The IAIS is engaged in a process of trying to develop a
“Common Framework for the Supervision of Internationally
Active Insurance Groups” (“ComFrame”), which establishes
13: “Even if the capital adequacy rules are sufficient to prevent
certain financial institutions from inserting walk-away clauses in
their EFC, many derivatives dealers and other persons carrying on
business through trading or entering into derivatives may not be
subject to the same or similar capital adequacy rules. A standard
rule for all EFCs should apply.”
297 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UN-
CITRAL”), UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
with Guide to Enactment (30 May 1997), online: UNCITRAL
5http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/
1997Model.html4 [“Model Law”].
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supervisory standards focusing on the effective group-wide
supervision of IAIG.298 Canada has three IAIG.
ComFrame is aimedat encouraging cross-border cooperation
by supervisors to address group-wide activities and risks;
identify and remedy supervisory gaps; and coordinate
supervisory activities, building on the insurance core
principles discussed earlier.299 Its consultation document
suggests that a “group-wide supervisor takes responsibility
for the supervision of the IAIG as a whole, on a group-wide
basis”.300 Essentially, supervisors would be responsible for
the supervision of the IAIG’s individual insurance legal
entities in their respective jurisdictions, but take into account
the effect of their supervisory actions on the rest of the
IAIG.301 Adoption of the ComFrame globally, once it has
been fully developed, has the potential to enhance the cross-
border cooperation and perhaps prevent significant loss of
value. Such international tools are very important, and
Canada is actively involved, but these processes take years
to put in place. Parliament should consider amending the
WURA now to explicitly protect Canadian policyholders and
creditors, while advancing the goals of comity and
international cooperation.
TheWURA should be amended to adopt language similar to
the BIA and CCAA provisions, to the effect of granting the
court authority tomake any order appropriate, if it is satisfied
that it is necessary for the protection of the debtor insurer’s
property or the interests of stakeholders. While a purposive
interpretation of the statute already arguably grants the court
this authority, express provisions would make that power
more transparent and certain.
298 IAIS, “ComFrame Consultation”, supra note 268 at 9.
299 Ibid. As part of ComFrame, the IAIS is developing a risk-based
global insurance capital standard: “ICS Version 2.0” to be used for
monitoring and confidential reporting to group-wide supervisors.
300 Ibid.
301 Ibid at 10.
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On the “out-bound side” of a cross-border insolvency of an
insurer, the court under its broad statutory authority under
WURA could authorize a liquidator to act as a representative
in respect of any proceeding under the statute for the purpose
of having it recognized in a jurisdiction outside Canada.
However, express language such as that adopted in theCCAA
and theBIAwouldmake clear this authority. Although there
was extensive cooperation between the liquidator and the
rehabilitator in the Confederation Life proceedings, there
was no formal court cooperation until an agreement was
reached on asset realization and “true up” between the
estates.302 This agreement was then sanctioned by both
Canadian and the US courts.303
Section 164(2) of theWURA currently provides the option of
turning over funds to the Canadian liquidator or retaining
them in the foreign jurisdiction and being deemed to have
abandoned any claims in the Canadian proceeding. There
should also be express provisions that, where creditors have
recovered in other jurisdictions, if an order is made under
WURA, the court can take account of that distribution in the
distribution to Canadian creditors. Here again, a purposive
reading of the current statutory language would indicate that
the court already has this authority, but provisions would
make it more transparent for both domestic and foreign
stakeholders.
Suggested legislative changes could include:
1. amending the WURA to grant the court authority to
make any order appropriate in a cross-border
proceeding, if it is satisfied that it is necessary for
the protection of the debtor’s property or the interests
302 Confederation Life Insurance Company, Order of Rehabilitation
issued by Circuit Court for Ingram County, 11 August 1994, Case
Number 94-78300-CR Settlement Agreement between the Commis-
sioner of Insurance for the State of Michigan and The Super-
intendent of Financial Institutions, dated 11 June 1996 at 39.
Agreement was approved by the Court effective 27 November 1996.
303 For a discussion see Sarra and Dunning, supra note 194.
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of policyholders, creditors and other stakeholders of
the insurer, including according recognition and relief
to a foreign representative in Canada and authorizing
a Canadian insolvency or restructuring professional to
represent the interests of the Canadian debtor insurer
and other stakeholders in foreign proceedings; and
2. amending theWURA to expressly set criteria for recogni-
tion, stayandremedies regardingcross-borderproceedings
for insolvent insurers and other financial institutions,
drawing on existing provisions of the BIA and CCAA
where appropriate.
There are new challenges as both technology and best practices
develop, and there should be public policy discussion as to how
the current insurer resolution system could be enhanced to
address thesenewchallenges.Thenext part briefly describes six
such challenges.
VII. NEW CHALLENGES FOR INSURER SOLVENCY
Thereareanumberof issues thatmayhavean impacton insurer
soundness or solvency in the coming period.
1. IFRS 17 effective 2022
First, is the shift to InternationalFinancialReportingStandard
17 Insurance Contracts (“IFRS 17”), which will become
effective for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January
2022.304 IFRS 17, issued by the Insurance Accounting
Standards Board,305 is aimed at bringing transparency,
304 International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation, “About
IFRS 17 Insurance Contracts” (2017), online: IFRS 5https://
www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/ifrs-17-insurance-
contracts/4 [“IFRS, ‘About IFRS 17 Insurance Contracts’”].
Deferred by the International Accounting Standards Board to one
year later than originally announced, online: IASB Press Release (14
November 2018) 5ifrs.org4.
305 Insurance Accounting Standards Board, “IFRS 17 Insurance
Contracts” (approved 18 May 2017, effective as of 1 January
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consistency and comparability to insurance companies
reporting financial results.306
Since insurance contracts combine features of financial
instruments and service contracts and many generate cash
flowswith substantial variability over a longperiod, IFRS17 is
aimedatcreatingmorereliableaccountingof theseproducts.307
IFRS17will combinecurrentmeasurementof futurecashflows
with the recognition of profit over the period that services are
provided under the contract; it will present insurance service
results such as insurance revenue separately from insurance
finance income or expenses;308 and it will require an entity to
make an accounting policy choice of whether to recognize all
insurance finance income or expenses in profit or loss or to
recognize some of that income or expenses in other
comprehensive income.309 A multinational insurer will have
to account for its insurance contracts consistently within the
corporate group, making it easier to compare results by
product and geographical area.310
OSFI is working with the life and P&C insurance industries
through a consultative process to change 2021 LICAT and
MCTguidelines tomeet the standards set out in IFRS17, and it
has reported that it may adjust certain aspects of the capital
tests or introduce transitional measures to alleviate the capital
impact.311
2022), online: IFRS 5https://www.ifrs.org/supporting-implemen-
tation/supporting-materials-by-ifrs-standard/ifrs-17/4.
306 International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation, “IFRS
17 Fact Sheet” (2017), online (pdf): IFRS 5https://www.ifrs.org/-/
media/project/insurance-contracts/ifrs-standard/ifrs-17-fact-
sheet.pdf4 [“IFRS, ‘IFRS 17 Fact Sheet’”].
307 IFRS, “About IFRS 17 Insurance Contracts”, supra note 304.
308 Ibid.
309 Ibid.
310 IFRS, “IRFS 17 Fact Sheet”, supra note 306.
311 OSFI, “Letter to Federally Regulated Life and Property and Casualty
Insurers regarding LICAT and MCT 2021 Review for IFRS 17” (27
June 2018), online (pdf): OSFI 5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/
Docs/licatmct_let.pdf4, replacing its predecessor IFRS 4. OSFI
reports that: “For life insurers with segregated fund guarantee (SFG)
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The risks to implementation of IFRS 17 for Canadian insurers
include the cost in time and resources to shift accounting
practices, given that all the functions reporting in to financial
reporting will be affected, including operational processes,
product pricing, data feeds, actuarial systems, general and
subledgers, and reporting systems.312
The greater transparency in financial statements that will be
required by IFRS 17 includes breakdown of insurance
liabilities between expected cash flows, risk adjustments and
profitability to be released, referred to as the “contractual
service margin”, and “how each of these components is being
released into net income”.313 For example, insurance
companies will no longer be able to front-end projected and
expected profits at the time of contract issuances.314 Interest
credited to insurance cash flows of insurance liabilities can no
longerbe tied toreturnon theassets supporting those liabilities,
which could increase volatility in both earnings and liabilities
accounting.315 The risk premium on future asset returns will
not be recognized in the discount rate, which may result in an
increase of an insurer’s policyholder liabilities. PwC has
observed that “the de-linking of asset returns from insurance
liabilities discount rates and thedifferentdiscount rates applied
to different components of the insurance contract liability will
mean implementing different asset-liability management and
hedging strategies”.316
business, the current methodology for determining associated capital
requirements will be maintained in 2021. Development work will
continue on a new standard approach for determining capital
requirements for SFG business, for implementation after 2021.”
312 PwC, “IFRS 17: Insurance accounting changes redefining the
industry” (11 October 2017) at 7, online): PwC 5https://
www.pwc.com/ca/en/industries/insurance/ifrs17.html4.
313 Ibid at 6.
314 Ibid at 5, PwC reporting that these profits will be held back in a new
insurance liability component, “the contractual service margin” and
will be amortized into income over each group of insurance
contacts’ coverage period.
315 Ibid.
316 Ibid at 7.
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The change to IFRS 17 standards could lead to quite different
reporting of capital and liquidity, which could result in
insolvency risk for insurance companies. The risk is that
insurers will no longer meet capital adequacy requirements,
particularly when accounting for legacy businesses such as
long-term care and variable annuities. The upside is that itmay
force companies to address these legacy liabilities by selling
these liabilities or taking other remedial action before IFRS 17
comes into effect.
2. IFRS 9 Financial Instruments and Disclosures
There are also issues associated with themove to International
Financial Reporting Standard 9 Financial Instruments and
Disclosures (“IFRS 9”) and OSFI’s guideline regarding the
application of IFRS 9 to federally-regulated financial
institutions.317 IFRS 9 was to be in place beginning in fiscal
2018, but the deadline has been deferred for life insurers until 1
January 2021 to allow for implementation of the 2018
introduction of OSFI’s new LICAT,318 as discussed
317 OSFI, “IFRS 9 Financial Instruments and Disclosures: Guideline”
(June 2016), online: OSFI 5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fi-if/rg-
ro/gdn-ort/gl-ld/Pages/ifrs9.aspx4. OSFI’s guideline is divided into
chapters addressing the Fair Value Option, Impairment and
Disclosure expectations and replaces the following seven guidelines
that were in effect under IAS 39: C-1 Impairment — Sound Credit
Risk Assessment and Valuation of Financial Instruments at
Amortized Cost; C-5 Collective Allowance — Sound Credit Risk
Assessment and Valuation Practices for Financial Instruments at
Amortized Cost; D-1, D-1A, D-1B Annual Disclosures; D-6
Derivatives Disclosures; and D-10 Accounting for Financial
Instruments Designated as Fair Value Option.
318 OSFI, “Advisory: Deferral of IFRS 9 Application for Federally
Regulated Life Insurers” (March 2017), online (pdf): OSFI5http://
www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/Docs/ifrs9def.pdf4, reporting that: “With
the publication in September 2016 of the IASB approved amend-
ment, Applying IFRS 9 Financial Instruments with IFRS 4 Insurance
Contracts, companies were given an option of exercising a
temporary exemption from applying IFRS 9 Financial Instruments
if their activities are predominately connected with insurance. The
IASB amendment is subject to The Canadian Accounting Standards
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previously. OSFI’s guideline provides application guidance to
insurers applying IFRS 9.319
OSFI’s concern is that use of the fair value option (“FVO”),
which permits companies to fair value any financial asset or
financial liability at initial recognition to profit and loss for
accounting purposes, may not be sufficiently reliable for
prudential capital purposes.320 More of an issue for deposit-
takingbanks,OSFIhas expressed concernabout the reliability
Board’s (Canadian AcSB) defined due process to incorporate into
the Chartered Professional Accountants (CPA) Canada Handbook-
Accounting any new standards or amendments when issued by the
IASB. As such, the amendment to IFRS 4 requires approval by the
Canadian AcSB for incorporation into the CPA Canada Handbook
— Accounting. OSFI considered the costs and benefits of the
temporary exemption and found a strong prudential need for
additional accounting guidance for life insurers... While OSFI
supports the improved standard over the existing IAS 39 Financial
Instruments Standard, OSFI also finds that a deferral of IFRS 9 for
life insurers is needed given the 2018 introduction of OSFI’s new
Life Insurance Capital Adequacy Test (LICAT). Thus, OSFI
expects life insurers to defer the application of IFRS 9 until the
expected effective date of the IASB new Insurance Contracts
Standard of January 1, 2021.”
319 The OSFI “IFRS 9” guideline applied to “an [insurer] or a fraternal
benefit society incorporated, formed or continued under the [ICA];
an insurance holding company incorporated or formed under Part
XVII of the [ICA]; and the Canadian branch of a foreign company
in respect of which an order under [s 574 of the ICA] has been
made”. OSFI, “IFRS 9 Financial Instruments and Disclosures:
Guideline Impact Analysis Statement” (June 2016), online: OSFI
5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fi-if/rg-ro/gdn-ort/gl-ld/Pages/
ifrs9_gias.aspx4 [“OSFI, ‘IFRS 9 Financial Instruments and
Disclosures: Guideline Impact Analysis Statement’”].
320 OSFI, “IFRS 9 Financial Instruments and Disclosures: Letter” (21
June 2016), online: OSFI 5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/fi-if/rg-
ro/gdn-ort/gl-ld/Pages/ifrs9_let.aspx4 [“OSFI, ‘IFRS 9 Financial
Instruments and Disclosures: Letter’”]. See also OSFI, “IFRS 9
Financial Instruments and Disclosures: Guideline Impact Analysis
Statement”, ibid: “OSFI’s Guideline D-1A and Guideline D-1B
expects federally regulated life and property & casualty insurers to
provide financial disclosures with their annual financial statements
or annual reports in addition to, or in conjunction with, all the
disclosures required by IFRS”.
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of fair values used by life insurers from a prudential
perspective, but it has said that it recognizes the need to
balance this concern against the fact that mortgages and loans
are less material in the case of life insurers and that the asset-
liability matching business model of life insurers will likely
require them to use “fair value through other comprehensive
income” (“FVOCI”) for their assets supporting policyholder
liabilities.321 OSFI’s guideline is aimed at addressing the
reliability of fair values of assets with unobservable market
inputs under IFRS9andensuring the changes in fair values are
not included as part of regulatory capital.322 OSFI seeks to
promote greater confidence in the fair valuation practices of
life insurers by reviewing their fair value practices and
developing a capital solution to address any quality of
capital issues for loans measured at fair value.
The implementation of IFRS 9 will provide greater
transparency and may require some insurers to take
corrective action to meet capital adequacy requirements.
3. Climate Change Insurance Financial Risk
Globally, many insurers in the 2017 PwC survey reported that
anthropogenic climate change is the biggest long-term risk for
insurers, with the rise in frequency of natural catastrophes
posing a “very large, even existential, threat to the insurance
industry”.323
321 OSFI, “IFRS 9 Financial Instruments and Disclosures: Letter”,
ibid. “If the business model results in life insurers classifying
mortgages and loans at FVOCI, OSFI is willing to allow them to
use the FVO to reclassify these mortgages and loans from FVOCI
to Fair Valued through Profit and Loss. Therefore OSFI has made
an exception for the mortgages and loans on life insurers’ financial
statements that would otherwise have been classified as FVOCI.”
322 Ibid.
323 PwC, “Insurance Banana Skins”, supra note 20 at 32. See also Janis
Sarra, “Fiduciary Obligations in Business and Investment: Implica-
tions of Climate Change”, CCLI Working Paper Series — April
2018.
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Climate change presents risk management challenges to the
insurance industry, both in terms of liability under P&C
policies and issues in respect of potentially stranded assets
regarding investments by insurers in the fossil fuel sector. In the
P&C insurance sector, excluding mortgage insurance,
catastrophes and weather-related losses are now a key risk
and have been a significant driver of earnings volatility in the
past two years. The Canadian P&C industry suffered a 67 per
cent decline of net income in 2016, mainly as a result of
catastrophe-related losses.324However,OSFI notes that,while
these events had a significant negative impact on industry
profitability, most insurers had geographically diversified
portfolios and adequate reinsurance.325
In 2018, the IAIS and the Sustainable Insurance Forum
(“SIF”), a network of insurance supervisors and regulators
collaborating to strengthen sustainability for the insurance
sector, published a paper on climate change risks to the
insurance sector.326 It reports strong scientific evidence that
climatechange ishavingan influenceonthe frequency, severity,
and distribution of natural catastrophes and extreme weather
events.327 The IAIS/SIF reports that, while insurers may be
equipped to adjust exposures from extreme events through
annual contract re-pricing, the potential for physical climate
risks may change in non-linear ways, resulting in unexpectedly
high claims burdens.328 Insured losses from climate-related
324 OSFI, Annual Report 2016-2017, supra note 16 at 11.
325 Ibid. OSFI has reported: “OSFI is conducting an expanded review
of industry reinsurance practices. The objective is to ensure that
institutions appropriately balance their financial resources in
Canada when compared to their insurance exposures, and have
comprehensive risk management practices to avoid over-reliance on
reinsurance and concentrated counterparty credit risks”: ibid at 11.
326 IAIS and Sustainable Insurance Forum, “Issues Paper on Climate
Change Risks to the Insurance Sector” (July 2018), online (pdf):
Wixstatic 5https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/eb1f0b_0e5af-
c146e44459b907f0431b9e3bf21.pdf4 [“IAIS/SIF ‘Issues Paper on
Climate Change Risks’”].
327 Ibid at 11-12.
328 Ibid at 14.
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natural catastrophes reached record levels in 2017, $138 billion
USD.329
The report observes:
Climate risks present significant material challenges for the insurance
sector, which are likely to grow over time. Insurers play a critical role in
the resilience of households, firms, and corporate sectors to physical
climate risks, which will become even more important in the future as
impacts begin to manifest with greater intensity. Through their under-
writing and investment activities, insurers are also exposed to the broad
range of physical and transition risks that may arise from climate change.
This may affect their capacity to write insurance business and pay
claims. The availability of insurance will hold important implications for
the evolution, speed, and smoothness of the low-carbon transition —
posing important strategic challenges for business models.330
i. Physical risks of climate change
The IAIS/SIF study reports that the insurance sector is affected
byphysical risksarising fromincreaseddamageand losses from
physical phenomena associated with climate trends, such as
changingweather patterns and sea level rise, and events such as
natural disasters and extreme weather.331 Uninsured losses
from physical risks may affect resource availability, the
profitability of firms and individual assets, pose supply chain
disruptions, and ultimately impact insurance market demand,
with cascading impacts across the financial system.332 The
329 Ibid. It reports: “Beyond insured losses from physical climate
damages, climate trends and shocks can pose economic disruptions
affecting insurers, the economy, and the wider financial system. The
insurance ‘protection gap’ for weather related losses remains
significant, with roughly 70% of losses uninsured (Figure 3) —
resulting in significant burden on households, businesses, and
governments.”
330 Ibid
331 Ibid at 14.
332 Ibid, citing Sandra Batten, Rhiannon Sowerbutts and Misa Tanaka,
“Let’s talk about the weather: the impact of climate change on
central banks”, Bank of England Working Papers No 603 — May
2016, online: Bank of England 5https://www.bankofengland.-
co.uk/working-paper/2016/lets-talk-about-the-weather-the-impact-
of-climate-change-on-central-banks4.
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study observes that the risk of uninsurability due to high
physical risk profiles may have significant impacts on the
performance of credit and investment across the economy. It
reports that pricing risks arise from changing risk profiles to
insured assets and property, changing mortality profiles and
demographic trends (life and health); claims risk arising from
unexpected confluence of extreme events such as concurrent
hurricanes; and strategic and market risks arising from
changing market dynamics.333
The IAIS/SIF report observes that climate change is already
affecting the frequency and concentration of high impact
natural catastrophes, leading to increases in weather-related
insurance claims.334 It further observes that, from a pricing
risk perspective, insurers’ capacity towrite insurance business
may be constrained by increasing physical risks to insured
propertyandassets. If risk-basedpricing risesbeyonddemand
elasticity and customer willingness to pay, and property in
high risk areas is being rendered uninsurable due to high
exposure to physical risks, such as wildfires, storms and sea
level rise, it may affect revenue sources.335
ii. Transition risks of climate change
The second major risk identified by the IAIS/SIF study is
transition risk, arising from shifts associated with the
transition to a low-carbon economy. Such risks may include
policy changes, market dynamics, technological innovation,
or reputational factors.336 Transition factors may impact the
typesof insuranceproductsandservicesdemanded fromfirms.
The IAIS/SIF study observes that while solar and other types
of renewable energy technologies are already cheaper than
fossil fuel generational technologies in certain markets, they
333 Ibid at 16.
334 Ibid, reporting, for example, that Lloyd´s reports to have paid out
$5.8 billion USD in major claims, most of which were climate-
related.
335 Ibid at 17.
336 Ibid at 15.
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create both risks and opportunities for insurers.337 The study
observes that liability risks include the risk of climate-related
claims under liability policies, as well as direct claims against
insurers for failing to manage climate risks, and there may be
exposure under D&O, personal injury and third-party
environmental liability policies.338
IAIS/SIF reports that life and health insurers are beginning to
understand the impactsof climate factorson theirunderwriting
portfolios, for example heat-related health issues associated
with extremes in weather events, especially for vulnerable
policyholders. It observes that impacts of climate change on
mortality are becoming a priority focus for actuaries regarding
relationship to insurance, annuity and pension programs.339
It further notes that while reinsurers may be more resilient to
climate factorsdue togeographicdiversification, as the severity
and frequency of significant natural disasters increases, the
availability and cost of reinsurance cover for weather-related
risksmaybecomeprohibitive for smaller insurers.340 It uses the
example of Canada, where total payout for weather-related
claims had been about $1 billion CAD per year over the past
decade, until 2017 when the Fort McMurray wildfire brought
the total liabilities to $4.5 billion CAD.341 The Canadian
general insurance market is comprised of many small insurers
and is heavily dependent on the international reinsurance
market to provide coverage for major natural catastrophes.
Although the 2017 liabilities did not present an issue to large
reinsurers, claims in other regions at the same time means that
there is potential for a reinsurance gap to emerge for weather-
337 Ibid, such as risk associated with sudden policy changes that affect
risk profiles of insured assets.
338 Ibid at 15.
339 Ibid at 18.
340 Ibid at 19.
341 Ibid. See also Jeremy Rudin, OSFI Superintendent, “A Climate of
Change” (remarks delivered at the 2016 National Insurance
Conference of Canada, Vancouver, BC, 29 September 2016), online:
OSFI 5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/osfi-bsif/med/sp-ds/Pages/
jr20160929.aspx4 [“Rudin, ‘A Climate of Change”].
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related losses if costs rise significantly or reinsurers stop
reinsuring or restrict reinsurance for these natural
catastrophes.342 OSFI has advised insurers to consider
whether their reinsurers’ business is concentrated in these
areas, and if so,whether there ispotential for lossof reinsurance
coverage.343
Moody’s, amajor credit-ratingagency, recently concluded that
climate change has a net negative credit impact on P&C and
reinsurance sector, reporting that although catastrophic events
have always been a key risk to P&C insurers and reinsurers, the
increase of insured property values along coastlines and
increased frequency of weather-related catastrophic events
will magnify the volatility over time and “result in a number of
risk management challenges associated with the assessment,
measurement and mitigation of catastrophic risks”.344
In response to climate risk, some insurers are updating their
product offerings, risk management processes and
342 Ibid.
343 Ibid at 19-20. To the extent such a risk exists, OSFI expects direct
insurers to identify alternatives to ensure they can meet their
liabilities to policyholders. See also Neville Henderson, OSFI
Assistant Superintendent, “Summary of remarks delivered at the
2018 Risk Canada Conference”, Toronto, ON, 13 June 2018),
online: OSFI 5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/osfi-bsif/med/sp-ds/
Pages/nh20180613.aspx4, identifying and elaborating on the three
key prudential risks associated with climate change: physical risks
— direct losses arising from weather-related events, such as storms,
floods, droughts, fires, etc, increased vulnerabilities to future events,
as well as increased costs of supply chain disruptions or resource
scarcity; investment risks — financial risks that could arise from
downward pressure on the value of carbon-linked assets during the
transition to a lower-carbon economy, and the speed with which the
transition takes place; and liability risks — claims that could arise
from parties that have experienced damage and loss from climate
change and seek to recover the loss from other parties whom they
deem responsible.
344 Moody’s Investor Service, “Climate change heightens key risks for
P&C insurance, reinsurance sectors” (15 March 2018), online:
Moody’s 5https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Climate-
change-heightens-key-risks-for-PC-insurancereinsurance-
PR_3808984.
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governance processes relating to climate change risks,
including using predictive methods and enhanced risk
modelling.345 The UN Principles for Sustainable Insurance
(“UNPSI”), the Geneva Association, and the Insurance
Development Forum have worked together to develop
frameworks that insurers can adopt to tackle different
aspects of the climate risk challenge.346
Insurance supervisors need to understand climate change
from a core prudential perspective, exploring how physical,
transition and liability factors may pose new solvency risks to
the safety and soundness of individual firms, and affect
stability of insurance markets.347 The IAIS/SIF report also
examines which of the insurance core principles are engaged
with climate change risk.
In 2015, theBankofEnglandPrudentialRegulationAuthority
assessed climate risk in the UK insurance sector, conducted a
high-level analysis of sector vulnerabilities, and set out a
framework for understanding the impacts of climate change on
insurers. In France, the Autorite´ de controˆle prudentiel et de
re´solution (“ACPR”) is actively including climate-related risks
in its day-to-day supervisory framework for insurers.348 The
ACPR in 2018 published an analysis of exposure of French
insurers to climate change risks, estimating that between 240
billion and 450 billion of assets could be issued by entities from
sectors exposed or potentially exposed to transition risks.349
Insurers are also addressing climate change in terms of their
own investment policies. Paris-based Axa SA has pledged to
345 IAIS/SIF “Issues Paper on Climate Change Risks”, supra note 325
at 22.
346 Principles for Sustainable Insurance and UNEP Finance Initiative,
“Home” (2018), online: UNEP/PSI 5http://www.unepfi.org/psi/4.
347 IAIS/SIF “Issues Paper on Climate Change Risks”, supra note 326
at 25.
348 Ibid at 48-49.
349 Ibid at 50, finding that issues include data consistency, better
understanding the relationship between physical and transition
risks.
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phase out insurance coverage for new coal construction
projects and oil sands businesses,350 andMunich Reinsurance
Co, the world’s biggest reinsurer, announced in 2018 that it is
stopping investment in bonds and shares of companies that
generate more than 30 per cent of their sales with coal-related
business.351 These strategies are at a nascent stage, insurers
lagging behind many large institutional investors.
4. Cybersecurity Risk
Cybersecurity risks include theft and ransom of customer
medical and financial data, corruption of insurers’ databases,
350 Gloria Gonzalez, “Coalition calls on US insurers to make invest-
ments in clean energy”, Business Insurance (31 January 2018),
online: 5https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20180131/
NEWS06/912318855/Coalition-calls-on-US-insurers-to-make-in-
vestments-in-clean-energy4. “As investors, the insurance industry,
under its liability-driven approach, is constrained by fiduciary
duties and regulations, according to a report called Climate Change
and the Insurance Industry: Taking Action as Risk Managers and
Investors published by the Zurich-based Geneva Association and
based on interviews with 62 C-level executives at 21 globally active
insurers and reinsurers. Insurers are addressing climate change
through their risk modeling and pricing, knowledge of preventive
measures and innovation in risk transfer solutions, as well as from
an operational perspective by reducing their carbon footprints,
according to the report....in December, AXA Group committed to
quadruple its green investment targets to reach 12 billion by 2020, as
the company reached its initial 3 billion investment target in 2015....
In addition, AXA pledged to phase out insurance coverage for new
coal construction projects and oil sands businesses, which required
some difficult conversations with the company’s underwriters about
why insuring such projects was not ‘good for the planet,’ he said. He
likens it to a health insurer declining to invest in tobacco companies
because of the health problems associated with smoking.”
351 Thomson Reuters, “Munich Re to back away from coal-related
business: CEO”, Business Insurance (6 August 2018), online:
5https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20180806/NEWS06/
912323159/Munich-Re-to-back-away-from-coal-related-business-
CEO-Joachim-Wenning4. “Swiss Re Ltd., world No. 2 by share
value, said in July it would not reinsure any company for which
thermal coal represents more than 30% of its business, following
French peer Scor SE.”
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and the theft of intellectual property.352 A recent example was
in May 2018 when fraudsters pierced the security at two of
Canada’s biggest banks and threatened to release the private
account information of 90,000 Canadians.353
New insurance products are trying to respond to these issues;
one example is cloud-based on-demand insurance, aimed at
protecting digital assets from cybersecurity threats using
innovative technology, insurance, and claims processes.354
OSFI has observed that whether or not an insurer is offering
insurance for cybersecurity risks, insurers themselves are
exposed to cyber risk as they offer new Internet-based
products and expand their share of customers’ insurance
portfolios.355Thepersonal informationheldby insurersmakes
their data attractive to fraudsters. OSFI observes that cyber-
attacks on insurance firms can result in significant, tangible
damage aswell as the loss of policyholders’ trust. Insurers need
both defences and controls in place to prevent cyber-attacks
and they need response plans to act quickly if their systems are
compromised. OSFI expects insurers to review cyber risk
management policies and practices to ensure that they remain
appropriate and effective in light of changing risks.356 OSFI
issued a “Cyber-Security Self-Assessment Guide” to assist
352 Ibid at 15.
353 Don Pittis, “Hacking attacks at BMO and CIBC’s Simplii highlight
why cybersecurity cannot be a patchwork job”, CBC News (30 May
2018), online: 5https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/bank-hacks-
cibc-simplii-bmo-1.46821624.
354 For example, “XL Catlin is creating the world’s first on-demand
cyber insurance solution for U.S. small and medium-sized business
and built on the Slice Insurance Cloud Services (ICS) platform. XL
Catlin is the third large insurer to use ICS since Slice launched the
platform in January of 2018”: “XL Catlin to Build World’s First
On-Demand Cyber Insurance Solution with Slice ICS”, Insurance
Canada (25 July 2018), online: 5https://www.insurance-canada.ca/
2018/07/25/xl-catlin-slice-cyber-solution/4.
355 Rudin, “A Climate of Change”, supra note 341.
356 OSFI, “Cyber-Security Self-Assessment Guide” (28 October 2013),
online: OSFI 5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fi-if/in-ai/Pages/
cbrsk.aspx4.
Annual Review of Insolvency Law / 1065
insurers in assessing cybersecurity readiness.357 In 2017, OSFI
announced that a new objective was to reexamine its role and
approach to enhancing cybersecurity at federally-regulated
financial institutions, including insurers.358
5. Other Fintech Issues
Innovations in financial technologies (“fintech”) pose both
opportunities and risks for insurers. The IAIS has observed
that fintech may disrupt the insurance sector by reducing
insurance market competitiveness over the long-term; cause
traditional insurers to exit the market; result in more
individualized insurance products that may affect price
comparability and consumer choice; increase insurance sector
interconnectedness due to the use of a limited number of
technology platforms; and lead to changes in insurer business
models if profit margins come under pressure.359 It notes that
while fintech may increase a focus on improving the customer
experience, it could give rise to issues of affordability of
insurance products, security issues regarding data, as
previously discussed, and increased financial exclusion.360
The challenge is really one of using available and rapidly
developing new technologies to respond to customer and
market changes; and ensuring that current monitoring of
prudential governance, capital andpolicyholder protection are
responsive to these changes.
6. Reinsurance and Counterparty Credit Risk
Risktransferandmitigationactivities suchasreinsuranceassist
direct insurers to reduce insurance risks and the volatility of
357 Ibid.
358 Ibid at 4.
359 IAIS, “FinTech Developments in the Insurance Industry” (21
February 2017), online: IAIS 5https://www.iaisweb.org/page/
news/other-papers-and-reports4.
360 Ibid. The IAIS report takes stock of financial innovations such as
the telematics, use of big data, robo-advisors, distributed ledger
technology, blockchain and smart contracts.
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financial results, stabilize solvency, and better withstand
catastrophic events.361 Reinsurance can also indirectly
benefit policyholders because it allows direct insurers to offer
coverage over a wider range of risks, and with higher coverage
levels.362
OSFI’s “OwnRiskSolvencyAssessment” (“ORSA”) guideline
emphasizes the importance of both emerging risks and risks
arising from risk transfer and mitigation, and counterparty
credit risk. OSFI reports that themajority of insurers, both life
and P&C, are managing their reinsurance risk prudently, in
accordance with OSFI’s “Sound Reinsurance Practices and
Procedures Guideline”.363 However, it has found a small but
significant group of insurers have concentrated counterparty
credit risk issues, in part because of their leveraged business
model, whereby insurers insure commercial risks in Canada,
while reinsuring a very significant portion of that risk offshore
with only small amounts of capital being maintained in
Canada.364 Highly concentrated exposure to a counterparty
poses the risk of impairing the insurer’s ability to compensate
policyholders in a severe but plausible event.365 OSFI is
engaged in a prudential review of these issues in 2018.366
VIII. CONCLUSION
Canada is, for the most part, “resolution ready” for insurance
company insolvency. There are strong policyholder
protections in place and mechanisms for early intervention to
remedy governance, capital and liquidity issues identified with
361 Rudin, who observes that insurers also benefit from reinsurers’
knowledge and expertise when expanding into new lines of business:
Rudin, “A Climate of Change”, supra note 341.
362 Ibid.
363 OSFI, “Guideline B-3: Sound Reinsurance Practices and Proce-
dures” (December 2010), online: OSFI5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/
Eng/fi-if/rg-ro/gdn-ort/gl-ld/Pages/b3_Sound.aspx4.
364 Rudin, “A Climate of Change”, supra note 341.
365 Ibid.
366 Ibid.
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insurers.Canada’s supervisoryandresolution systemmeasures
up relatively well compared with international standards,
although this article suggests some legislative reforms that
would fill identified gaps, offer greater protection to
stakeholders, and further enhance the resolution regime. One
priority should be solvent recovery and resolution, as it offers
the most effective way of protecting policyholders and the
safety and soundness of the insurance system. There are
significant challenges ahead, with changes to insurance
products, accounting and capitalization requirements, and
emerging insurance risks such as climate change, all of which
deserve careful attention moving forward.
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